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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this research is to investigate the importance of 
institutional investors in the UK economy, in particular, the capital market. 
Institutional investors have grown considerably in size over the past three 
decades and are involved in many aspects of the economy, consequently 
investigation of this issue is essential in order to determine their influence. 
There are three main empirical studies in this thesis. The first 
examines a sample of UK non-financial firms in an attempt to explain the 
ownership structure. It will attempt to show which firm variables attract 
institutional investors. A second aspect of the research is an analysis of the 
buying and selling activities of institutional investors to see whether they effect 
the general level of share prices. A third focus of the research is to analyse the 
switching activities of the institutional investors. This refers to their switching 
of funds from one type of asset to another e. g. from real property into equities 
and vice versa. By examining these activities the study illustrates the demand 
characteristics these institutional investors create for certain assets and in 
addition it provides a clearer understanding of the economic conditions that 
influence such investment behaviour. The thesis confirms the continuing 
importance of institutional investors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Institutional investors are financial intermediaries who provide 
liquidity to short-term money markets and make long term investments in the 
"secondary" as well as the "primary" capital market. The four major groups of 
interest are pension funds, insurance companies, unit trusts and investment 
trusts. This discussion is limited to these four major groups of institutional 
investor in the UK, because these institutional investors specialise in the 
holding of long term securities quoted on the Stock Exchange with which this 
study is predominantly concerned. It is also the same basis used in. past 
studies. 
One of the most significant features of the capital markets over the 
last thirty years has been the rise of the institutional investor. This growth has 
led to the system being described as `money manager capitalism" . In the 
1980's in the UK the process of privatisation led to a reversal in this growth of 
institutional investors by significantly increasing the number of small, private 
investors. However, the collapse in the share prices in 1987 led to a loss in 
confidence of small, private investors and so the trend toward institutional 
investor dominance re-asserted itself. 
Institutional investors are of special interest because they are the 
intermediaries through which the vast majority of people invest in stock market 
securities. Their presence is now so pronounced that every facet of investment 
is affected by their existence. The past three decades have witnessed a 
phenomenal growth in their size. In 1957 they collectively held 19% of the 
total value in issue whereas by 1978 this had risen to 47%Z . The present figure 
stands nearer to 63%3. 
1Kregal (1988) 
2 Rutterford (1983) 
3 Phillips and Drew (1990) 
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It is important to discuss the significance of institutional investors 
before proceeding with this present study. 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 
Size 
The growth of the institutional investors has been aided by 
favourable tax treatment and the attractions of a diversified portfolio which they 
are able to provide the individual. They also offer the investment expertise that 
an individual may lack. 
The size and the concentration of the institutional investors presents 
a problem in the sense that the UK has a relatively small client base, compared 
to the NYSE, which is dominated by some 150 institutional investors. This 
concentrated structure may lead to some potential problems. For example, the 
institutional investors may behave in a `herd-like' fashion, where unidirectional 
investment takes place e. g. bear and bull markets. Because of this herd-like 
movement in security markets they may be in a position to influence 
government policy by not investing in the gilts market. 
The behaviour of institutional investors may also give rise to fads 
and fashions with potentially unhealthy effects on merger activity. They may 
cause a disproportionate rise in the share prices of the firms in which they 
invest. This gives the firms in which they invest a greater opportunity to 
leverage their financial position in an acquisition. In biassing investment 
decisions toward `blue chips' or the high-tech sector securities the institutional 
investors may unintentionally affect the capital structure of an industry. 
Another allegation regarding institutional investors is to accuse them of `short 
termism' which is the tendency for them to focus on the short-run share price 
behaviour rather than long-term industrial developments. For example, 
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turnover (purchases plus sales as a proportion of holdings) rose from 35% to 
over 60% between 1981 and 1987 pointing to a `churning' of portfolios in an 
attempt to improve short run performance. ' 
Mergers and Acquisitions 
Two opposing views can be taken regarding mergers and 
acquisitions. Critics (e. g. Minns (1980)) view takeovers as a prelude to `asset 
stripping' and claim that institutional investors are ready to vote with their feet 
rather too readily and to take short term gain for their policy holders or 
pensioners rather than to hold for the longer term. In this case their influence is 
negative. By holding large concentrations of shares they facilitate mergers and 
acquisitions and they are in a position to determine the success or failure of 
takeovers, leveraged buy-outs etc. 
On a more positive note takeover activity can be regarded as being 
crucial to the efficient operation of a free market economy (Hughes et al 
(1985)). Takeovers perform a useful function by being a constant threat to less 
efficient managements reminding them that if they fall too far behind in the 
competitive race then the company will shift into the hands of others who are 
able to extract greater returns. This assumes that the predator firm will produce 
a structure which is more efficient and this assumption may be unrealistic. 
° See Foley (1991) 
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Passivity 
This raises the question as to what is the role of British institutional 
investors in the UK. Are they active or passive? As major shareholders should 
they exercise power to bring pressure on incumbent managements in order to 
achieve greater performance efficiency? (Walker (1987)) . On the whole UK 
institutional investors tend to be passive (see Midgley (1973)). It is not their 
job to scrutinise the behaviour of managers, their area of expertise is regarding 
the value of the firm not the working of it. However, it is to the benefit of all if 
the institutional investors were to develop a more pro-active policy and to take 
a closer interest in the performance of companies whose shares are a part of 
their portfolios. 
Volatility 
Whether or not greater concentration of holdings by the institutional 
investors leads to a greater level of volatility in markets is an issue much at the 
forefront of US studies. 
The trading of blocks of shares and portfolio restructuring on the 
part of institutional investors has the potential to increase the volatility of 
markets and may undermine long term liquidity. Consequently derivative 
markets, i. e. futures and options, are advocated as more efficient ways of 
hedging and/or restructuring a portfolio. 
The rapid switching of a substantial portfolio by a large investment 
fund is expensive in terms of commissions and it may move the market 
adversely. 
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Much of the evidence over the past twenty five years points to the 
fact that `buy-and-hold' strategies normally outperform trading strategies. For 
this reason institutional holdings should become more stables . 
Outline of Study 
The thesis is set out as follows: Chapter 1 looks at some of the 
major studies in the area of institutional investors. It summarises their main 
findings and highlights some of the issues that will be dealt with in the course 
of this thesis. It also looks at institutional investors in an international 
framework in order to discern whether UK institutional investors are unique in 
their dominance of equity markets. 
Chapter 2 analyses the four groups of institutional investors 
individually in order to get a clearer understanding of their size, the competitive 
structure within which they operate, their aims and their accountability to 
policyholders. 
Chapter 3 attempts to empirically investigate the variables attracting 
institutional investors into certain firms. It looks at a sample of 278 UK non- 
financial firms for the year 1989 in order to analyse some of the leading 
characteristics of these firms, namely those variables measuring firm size and 
the instability of the firm. 
Chapter 4 addresses many of the conjectures made about the 
institutional investors effects on the stock market. It looks at evidence from 
past studies and focuses on three main areas; namely efficiency, the use of 
information and volatility. 
See Lorie, JH and Hamilton, M: The Stock Market: Theories and Evidence. 
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Chapter 5 empirically analyses the buying and selling activities of 
institutional investors to see whether they effect the general level of share 
prices. It also seeks to establish whether there is a long run stable relationship 
between the institutional investors. 
Chapter 6 considers the switching activities of the institutional 
investors. This refers to the institutional investors switching from one type of 
asset into another e. g. from property into equities and vice versa. This attempts 
to show the demand the institutional investors themselves create for certain 
assets and may serve to provide a clearer understanding of the economic 
conditions that influence their investment behaviour. 
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CHAPTER 1- EMPIRICAL REVIEW. 
Institutional investors play a major role in the British financial 
market and their very presence is an area that needs to be investigated. There 
has been very little accountability of their actions in the past despite the volume 
of assets under their control. The influence of institutional investors on share 
prices have far reaching effects on the type of firm they invest in and the 
implications of this. 
UK institutional investors are an under-researched area despite their 
size and potential influence. The major UK studies in this area have been a 
study by Briston and Dobbins (1978) which was the first of its kind analysing 
UK institutional investors in depth and looking at their development up-to the 
mid-seventies. A Government study, `The Wilson Report'', analysed UK 
financial institutions and their affects on the economy. More recently, Hughes 
et al (1985) have analysed institutional investment, company performance and 
mergers. The main findings of all these studies will be highlighted below. 
Other than these, the topic of institutional investors has been restricted to either 
general references to these institutional investors or a few miscellaneous pages 
in finance text books. 
Another aspect worthy of mention is how UK institutional investors 
fare within an international framework. This enables us to discern whether the 
growth of institutional investors is a unique feature restricted to the UK 
financial market or whether it is similar for all developed countries. This will 
also help to highlight relative differences in the industrial and financial structure 
between countries. 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the past studies in the area and 
so set the present study into some comprehensive framework. 
I The Wilson Report (1980). HMSO Command Paper 7837. Committee to Review the Functioning of 
Financial Institutions Report. Chaired by Sir Harold Wilson. 
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1.1 - EARLIER RESEARCH 
Prais (1976) initially drew attention to the role of institutional 
investors in the evolution of giant fines in the UK. The implications of the rise 
of these intermediaries is that their ownership of the majority of UK ordinary 
shares has led to a fear of concentration of `financial' power over industry. 
This fear was shared by others. The Governor of the Bank of England' noted 
the growing concentration of investment and equity holdings in the hands of 
the institutional investors. Rutterford (1983) stated that their presence was now 
so prominent that every facet of investment is affected by their existence. Their 
investment strategies and performance have economy-wide consequences. 
The first of the major studies in this area was by Briston and 
Dobbins (1978). They described the growth of the institutional investors and 
analysed their likely impact upon the Stock Exchange, corporate management 
and shareholders. Their study was based on the years 1966-1975. Their 
research led to many interesting findings which are too numerous to discuss 
here, however, their main findings which are of relevance to this present study 
are listed below: 
i) During the period 1966-1975 institutional investors have been persistent net 
purchasers of company and overseas securities. 
ii) They do not concentrate their equity holdings in the top 30-50 British 
companies. 
iii) Institutional shareholdings increase with time in all classes of company - 
smaller companies, large companies and the largest companies. 
iv) They are not active in the new issues market. Their holdings in new and 
smaller companies increase with time. 
v) The buy-and-hold policies of insurance companies and pension funds may 
eventually create highly volatile, thin equity markets. 
2 Governor of the Bank of England (1984) speech at the investment conference of the National Association 
of Pension Funds. Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin. vol. 24. 
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vi) Large block acquisitions and disposals by institutional investors may cause 
major swings in share prices. 
vii) Research suggests that institutional investment performance tends towards 
the average. Professional investment managers offer diversification, but not 
performance. Higher levels of portfolio activity are not associated with better 
performance. 
viii) The rapid growth provides scope for speculation about their roles in 
corporate planning, takeover situations, provision of finance for industry, 
industrial democracy and share price management. 
ix) They have the necessary voting strength to influence company directors 
when combined. 
x) There is no evidence to suggest that they behave in such a way as to stabilise 
stock market prices by ironing out peaks and troughs of the all-share index. 
The second major piece of work in this area was the Wilson Report 
(1980) which was set up to analyse the role of the institutional investors in the 
UK. The report was very concerned with the growing importance of the 
institutional investors, particularly pension funds and insurance companies in 
the capital market. The report highlighted what they regard as the main 
problems raised by the institutional investors, the main points of significance to 
this study are: 
i) The lack of accountability of the institutional investors. 
ii) The investment strategies of the institutional investors. British industry and 
thus the economy as a whole was suffering because institutional investors were 
investing enormous sums overseas. 
iii) Small and new companies were being starved of a means of finance as 
institutional investors preferred investing in large, well established companies. 
iv) The institutional investors were also accused of `short termism', caring 
only for their short term profits in order to compete for custom. 
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The Wilson Report did initiate a response and several studies 
followed either justifying the behaviour of institutional investors or criticising 
it. The first of the above points will be discussed in chapter two where this 
study will look at the accountability of the different groups of institutional 
investors individually. Regarding the second point Schuller (1984) expressed 
concern with the volume of funds going overseas, "... the most significant 
single aspect of investment patterns over the last five years has been the flow 
of capital overseas since exchange controls were lifted. " 
Sir James Ball (1984) argued that this was rational behaviour 
because it reduces risk in two ways. Firstly, by being a means of diversifying 
institutional holdings it spreads risk. Secondly, it avoids the risk of a slump in 
the domestic economy. Economic prospects may be superior overseas than in 
the UK. In a recent paper by French and Poterba (1991) they argue that most 
countries invest the majority of their assets domestically and so under- 
diversify. The British, however, do invest more overseas than other countries. 
For example, at the end of 1989, Japanese investors had only 1.9% of their 
equity in foreign stocks, while US investors held 6.2% of their equity portfolio 
overseas. The British held 18% of their portfolio abroad, divided almost 
equally among the US, continental Europe and Japan? 
It is not too surprising that British investors hold more equity 
outside their own borders since the UK is a smaller share of the total world 
equity market than the US or Japan. However, the diversification of UK 
portfolios is a relatively recent phenomenon since the relaxation of capital 
controls in 1979.4 
In the same vein the institutional investors' risk averse investment 
strategies lead to smaller firms and new ventures not being economically sound 
investments, given the nature of the institutional investors' liabilities. 
3 See Table 1p 222 French and Poterba (1991). American Economic Review. Vol. 81. No. 2. 
4 See Howell and Cozzini (1990), p 30 : International Equity Flows. (European Equity Research (1990). 
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Furthermore, it may not be worth their while incurring the accompanying 
transaction and monitoring costs. 
Exit might be an important criterion as it is easier for them to dispose 
of the shares of larger companies in the face of poor performance rather than of 
smaller companies. There is evidence to suggest that institutional shareholdings 
increase with time in all classes of company (Briston and Dobbins (1978)). 
More recently Hughes, Cosh, Singh and Kumar (1985) examined 
empirically a number of issues concerned with the relationship between 
institutional investors' ownership of UK company securities and the 
companies' economic performance. The study is the most thorough to date 
examining the affects of UK institutional investors. Briefly their main findings 
are: 
i) The study noted a sharp increase in the ownership of UK companies by 
pension funds and insurance companies. For the last quarter of the century, 
there has been a secular increase in the proportion of total equity of UK 
companies held by financial institutional investors. 
ii) No systematic evidence was found about the ability and willingness of 
institutional investors to exert influence over company policy, although the 
study noted they were not as inactive as generally portrayed. 
iii) Their empirical study showed no systematic difference between the group 
of companies in which institutional investors had substantial holdings and the 
group in which they did not. 
iv) It was found that firms' past performance exerted a significant influence on 
subsequent performance and that there was in general a positive effect of 
institutional investors' holdings on profitability. This effect, however, was not 
statistically significant. 
v) The dividend income of companies with substantial institutional holdings 
was markedly less than that of companies without such holdings. Also more 
surprisingly, the dividend income of the former group was also less stable than 
that of the latter. 
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In addition to their empirical work they also sent out a questionnaire 
to various institutional investors. From their questionnaire they found that 
i) The institutional investors differed in their overall investment strategies 
depending upon their objectives, their tax position and past history. 
ii) All institutional investors felt performance pressure, and these pressures 
were increasingly for short term performance and were rising. 
The increasingly important and growing role of institutional 
investors in firms leads us to question their relationship with the firms in which 
they invest. They have been urged by the government, the Bank of England 
and many economists to get more involved in these firms and they may not be 
as passive as generally portrayed (see also Midgley (1973) and Cadbury 
(1990)). 
The rise in the level of institutional presence has led to a rise in 
wider share ownership and consequently to an increase in the demand for 
information on companies and on their activities according to Cadbury (1990). 
The direct result of wider interest in companies is that the chairmen of their 
boards are now subject to greater attention from financial analysts and 
commentators. 
Before the study looks further at the implications of a wider share 
ownership structure it is important to see how the situation evolved in the first 
place. This is in order to be able to analyse the institutional investors role in the 
ownership structure of industry. Over the years there has been a significant 
change in the structure of the large corporation with widely dispersed shares 
leading to a separation of ownership from control. This notion was pioneered 
by Berle and Means (1932) who concluded that the conflict between the 
interests of owners and the interests of managers was detrimental to the owners 
of the firm because it meant a move away from profit maximisation. The wide 
dispersal of ownership led holders of corporate stock to experience a loss of 
control over their resources while the manager exercised more freedom on the 
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use of the firms resources (see Williamson (1964), Baumol (1962), Marris 
(1964) for alternative managerial theories). 
The Berle and Means(1932) study led to a stream of controversial 
literature either supporting or criticising their conclusions. Pitelis (1984), for 
example, argued that capitalists do not find it beneficial to relinquish control 
but they cannot expand and retain control. 
The debate is now put in a much wider context of agency theory 
where managers are agents acting on behalf of the shareholders but given some 
decision making authority (see Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama and Jensen 
(1983), Tirole (1986) etc. ). There are still problems of agency costs arising 
such as the need for monitoring management in order to ensure they comply 
with shareholders' wishes (see Arrow (1984), Schliefer and Vishny (1980)). 
It seems now that institutional investors do have a growing role to 
play in company affairs unlike that stated by Berle and Means. The potential 
power of these institutional investors is highlighted by Cadbury (1990) in the 
following statement, "Where they have intervened, as they have to point out 
anomalies in proposals for bonus schemes, they have usually persuaded the 
board to change its mind". Therefore, the institutional investors do have a 
decisive voice in a company's affairs through their voting power, particularly 
as it is the institutional investors who between them may have significant 
control over the company and are thus in a position to bring about changes in 
the boardroom of companies which are failing to achieve adequate results. 
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Next it is important to look at institutional investors in an 
international framework. 
1.2 - INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS. 
The importance and role of institutional investors differs 
significantly from country to country. For example, in the United States 
pension funds hold a fifth of equities and in the United Kingdom they account 
for a quarter of personal sector assets. But in Germany they are of minor 
importance. ' 
This study is interested in what accounts for these differences. The 
majority of pension fund members are affiliated as a consequence of their 
employment. Therefore rates of return on pension funds do not attract 
investors in the same way as do those for other types of financial asset. 
However, the nature of the benefits offered may provide an incentive to work 
for a particular company. 
One of the main determinants of the scale of benefits and advantages 
of pension funds as a means of saving is taxation . In the UK, employees' and 
employers' contributions, unlike wages, are not subject to national insurance 
contributions. This treatment is broadly similar in the US, Canada and Japan. 
In Japan other forms of saving such as life insurance also enjoy tax privileges. 
The next section examines whether large holdings of equities by 
institutional investors is a general phenomenon across advanced countries, or 
whether it is limited to the UK. 
5 See Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin: `The Development of Pension Funds - An International 
Comparison. " (August 1991) 
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1.21 - EQUITY OWNERSHIP IN ADVANCED COUNTRIES. 
There has been growing concern expressed about the effect of 
institutional investors equity holdings on UK's industrial performance; 
however, little attention has been paid to developments in other advanced 
countries. Nevertheless, UK's environment is constantly compared and 
contrasted with other countries. 
There are a number of issues involved here. If the extent of 
institutional investors' equity holdings in other countries are as high, or have 
grown as fast, as in the UK it is questionable whether this has influenced 
industrial performance in the same way. Similarities in the level of growth of 
holdings are not by themselves sufficient for this type of analysis. One also 
needs to know the distribution of this across institutional investors and across 
industrial companies. More importantly one needs to examine whether the 
objectives of the institutional investors and the instruments for influence at their 
disposal are similar across countries. Obviously, all other factors which 
influence industrial performance have also to be taken into account before one 
can move to a comparison of industrial performance across countries. 
In a study by Hughes, Cosh, Singh and Kumar (1985) data were 
presented for the percentage of outstanding shares accounted for by insurance 
companies and pension funds, and other categories of shareholders. 
Comparisons are made between the year ending 1964 and the year ending 
1982. Data were obtained for these two benchmark years for the following six 
countries: UK, US, Japan, Italy, Germany and Canada. Their results are 
printed in Table 1; however, care must be taken when making international 
comparisons as the statistical techniques vary from country to country! 
e See their discussion of data on p11 of the Office of Fair Trading Report by Hughes et at (1985) 
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Table 1- International Comparison of The Equity Holdings of Investors 
(year ending 1964 compared with year ending 1982) 
UK us JAPAN ITALY GERMANY CANADA 
1964 1982 1964 1982 1964 1982 1964 1982 1964 1982 1964 1982 
Insurance 
Companies 
and Pension 
18.3 45.9 8.7 18.9 8.0 32.6 0.8 3.5 2.1 2.6 13.0 11.7 
Funds 
Other 
Financial 7.9 8.3 4.5 4.8 17.5 14.8 0.2 1.0 2.1 2.8 7.7 4.5 
Institutions 
Households 60.9 23.9 84.6 60.2 48.6 30.6 37.7 12.4 20.9 14.9 68.9 44.6 
Others 12.9 21.9 2.3 16.1 25.9 22.0 51.3 83.0 74.9 79.7 10.4 39.2 
PERCENTAGE OF OUTSTANDING SHARES 
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Table 1 shows that at the end of 1964 insurance companies and 
pension funds accounted for just over 18% of outstanding domestic equity 
shares in the UK. This quite significantly exceeded the amount held by any 
other country, with the next largest holding of equity by these institutional 
investors being in Canada, followed by the US and Japan. It is interesting to 
note that Italy and Germany held almost negligible amounts despite being 
closer to the UK in terms of their industrial structure and output. Households 
were the most important holders in the US, accounting for 84.6% of 
outstanding shares. This was followed by Canada, the UK and then Japan. 
Once again Italy and Germany lagged behind. 
Turning now to look at end 1982 values it can be seen that the UK 
has kept its lead with insurance companies and pension funds. They now 
account for nearly 46% of the outstanding equity. In Japan they accounted for 
nearly 33% and in the US 19%. The sharpest increase in this proportion 
occurred in Japan and Italy where there was over a fourfold increase. Despite 
this increase in Italy they still remain very small. In the UK and US the 
increase in proportion was also very substantial whereas in Germany there was 
little change. Canada, which was the second largest holder of outstanding 
shares held by insurance companies and pension funds in 1964 has actually 
declined its holdings by 1982. 
The share of `other financial institutions' remained much more stable 
with small increases in the UK, US and Germany, but a notable decline in 
Japan and Canada. Finally, Households have fallen in their importance in all 
these countries although in the US they still hold over 60% of shares. 
Households have fallen by a greater percentage in the UK than in any other 
country. 
This shows that whilst the growth of institutional investors, in 
particular, insurance companies and pension funds, is not unique in the UK, 
what is highly significant is the fact that in 1964 UK insurance companies and 
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pension funds' proportion of equity holdings were substantially higher than in 
any other country and this lead has continued. 
The reasons for this could be that the social security systems differ 
in these other countries. In the UK people are more responsible for themselves 
whereas the level of government involvement is higher in other countries so the 
funds are not as large. Another reason may be the whole process of financing 
industry - in countries such as Germany industry has closer links with the 
banks. In the UK industry has to look for other means of finance outside the 
banking sector. 
1.3 - SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has reviewed some of the major pieces of work in this 
area. It has summarised their main findings and consequently put this present 
study in some perspective. The major studies discussed have been those of 
Briston and Dobbins (1978), the Wilson Report (1980) and Hughes, Cosh, 
Singh and Kumar (1985). 
Briston and Dobbins discuss some of the implications of the growth 
of institutional investors. Their findings show that institutional investors lead 
to higher levels of volatility and cause major swings in share prices due to their 
activities. Institutional investors also have the potential to influence company 
directors and were found to neglect the new issues market. They offered 
increased diversification but not necessarily increased performance. Briston 
and Dobbins thus view institutional investors as wielding considerable 
influence on many aspects of the economy. 
The Wilson Report highlighted four main criticisms continually 
directed at institutional investors. These were: 
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1) Their lack of accountability to policy holders. 
2) Their funds being invested overseas. 
3) Their lack of investment in smaller companies or new ventures and 
4) Their activities being short-term orientated. 
The Wilson Report was critical of the behaviour of institutional 
investors. However, it failed to consider the rationality behind their actions. It 
is logical for institutional investors to diversify their portfolios and if they see 
other countries offering a greater return with a lower level of risk then it is 
rational for them to invest overseas. In the case of smaller companies and new 
ventures the transaction costs attached to these assets may not be worth 
incurring. 
Hughes et at were less critical of institutional investors. They found 
no evidence that increased institutional investment influenced company policy. 
They also found no conclusive evidence that companies with institutional 
investors performed better than companies without institutional investors, 
however, in general there was found to be a positive effect of institutional 
investors on the profitability of firms. 
Larger firms in the UK are generally portrayed as having a widely 
diffuse ownership structure. This chapter outlined briefly the evolution of large 
companies which has resulted in debates on the divorce between the ownership 
and control of companies, dating from Berle and Means (1932). This diffusion 
of shares has led to problems of conflicting goals between the managers of 
companies and the actual owners. Some studies have said that increased 
institutional investment has actually led to a greater scrutiny in firms where the 
director is put under greater pressure to provide answers to his institutional 
investors (Cadbury (1991)). 
Although this thesis does not attempt to analyse all their findings 
some of the anecdotal evidence emerging from these studies is important. 
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UK institutional investors should also be considered in an 
international framework. The holdings of outstanding equity in the UK were 
compared with those of US, Japan, Canada, Italy and Germany between two 
benchmark years - 1964 and 1982. It was found that in 1964 UK pension 
funds and insurance companies in comparison with those in other countries, 
far exceeded the amount of outstanding equity shares held. The same situation 
applied in 1982. The growth of institutional investors was not unique to the 
UK but the proportion of equity held by UK institutional investors was higher 
and this lead has continued. This may be due to many reasons such as the 
nature of the relationships between industry, the government and banks. These 
relationships maybe closer in the countries with lower institutional investor 
holdings. In the UK the relationship between banks and industry is relatively 
weak and so industry is compelled to look for other sources of finance. Further 
and more thorough investigation of the international framework is required 
before any firm conclusions are drawn. 
This chapter has shown that in aggregate, institutional investors are 
important in the UK. It is now appropriate to examine them in more detail and 
establish the institutional framework within which they operate. 
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CHAPTER 2- INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS DESCRIBED 
INTRODUCTION 
Institutional investors are classified into four major categories - 
pension funds, insurance companies, unit trusts and investment trusts. These 
institutional investors differ from deposit taking institutions such as banks and 
building societies in that they have longer time horizons and they operate 
principally in the capital market. They are similar to deposit taking institutions 
in so far as they aggregate savings from a variety of sources and apply them to 
various outlets. They differ in that they do not necessarily offer a specific rate 
of interest and they do not guarantee the value of the investment. The return 
will depend on how well the underlying investments perform. They invest in 
different types of assets - money market instruments, equities, fixed interest 
securities, property and even, in the case of pension funds, fine art. 
In the case of pension funds and insurance companies the majority 
of the savings flow they mobilise takes the form of contractual commitments. 
Unit and investment trusts, on the other hand, have been more geared toward 
lump sum investment although they do allow for regular savings plans. 
This chapter begins by describing the four major types of 
institutional investors individually in terms of their size, competitive structure, 
objectives and regulation. Once it is established who they are, how they 
function and the industrial structure within which they operate, as well as the 
different sanctions and accountability to their policyholders, they can be 
analysed collectively to develop a clearer understanding of their aggregate size 
and their asset choice. 
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2.1 - PENSION FUNDS 
Size 
Pension funds are the largest growing of the four groups and 
represent the largest proportion of funds. The size and influence of pension 
funds in the UK has grown enormously in the last twenty years. In 1969, 
pension funds had a total value of around £5 billion and owned an estimated 
9% of the UK stock market. At the end of 1989, the market value of funds is 
estimated to have risen to over £250 billion and they owned 30% of quoted 
equities' . 
This growth can be attributed to three main elements: inflation, 
legislation and social change. Inflation increased the size of contributions 
needed to fulfil the basic promises given by final salary pension schemes. The 
1975 Social Security Pension Act introduced an earnings-related state pension 
over and above the flat-rate retirement pension. Many new company schemes 
were set up in the immediate aftermath of the Act and a new government came 
into power in 1979. The 1980s have changed many of these aspects of growth. 
Structural change has meant that those companies with a tradition of wide 
pension fund membership in their workforce have been contracting 
employment, while new growth has been concentrated in smaller companies 
and self-employment. The governments policy of encouraging personal and 
portable pension funds has begun to have its effect on membership which is 
now voluntary. 
Pension funds can be subdivided into three sectors - the private 
sector, other public sector and local authority sector. Figure 2.1 shows that 
private sector pension funds are the most important sector in terms of both 
asset size and the rate of growth. They are followed at a slower pace by the 
other public sector funds and lastly, local authority pension funds. 
'Pension Funds and Their Advisors (1990) 
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FIGURE 2.1 - THE MARKET VALUE OF PENSION FUND ASSETS 
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The growth in all three sectors accelerated after 1979. After this year 
growth has been more observable in the private sector which accounts for the 
majority of pension fund assets. Despite the graph being in nominal terms there 
is evidence of a sharp rise in assets over a relatively short period of time. 
In 1963, the private sector had assets amounting to £2.8 billion 
which rose gradually to £6.2 billion in 1971 and to £15.3 billion in 1978, 
however, by 1983 these assets had more than doubled and represented £42.9 
billion. More recently, in 1987 the stock of assets had risen to a staggering 
£129.6 billion. Other public sector funds have grown from £1 billion in 1963 
to £40.1 billion in 1987 wth the majority of the growth taking place after 1979. 
Local authority pension funds have registered a more conservative growth rate 
with assets rising from £0.7 billion in 1963 to £26.4 billion in 1987. 
These growth rate differences are due to a number of factors. There 
are more people working in the private sector and this trend is likely to 
continue as the government is encouraging personal, private pensions. There 
has not been as much growth in the other public sector which represents 
mainly nationalised industries. This is because many of the previously 
nationalised industries have been privatised and so have switched their 
pensions to the private sector. There have also been cutbacks in employment in 
local authorities. 
The growth rate differences can also be explained by the nature of 
their investments. Private sector funds have invested mainly in UK and 
overseas equities and so have benefitted from high returns over part of that 
period. Local authority funds invested more in gilts than the private sector 
funds. They were also heavier investors in overseas assets and lighter in 
property than private sector funds. Other public funds were slower than the 
other two funds to build up their overseas assets but were stronger in the 
property market. This will be dealt with more fully in chapter six. 
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Competitive Structure 
TABLE 2.1 
The Number of Pension Funds Ranked by Asset Size 
Asset size (£m) Number of Funds % Distribution 
500+ 91 8.6 
250 - 999 138 13.1 
100 - 249 170 16.1 
50 - 99 143 13.5 
25 - 49 203 19.0 
10 - 24 312 30.0 
TOTAL 1057 
Source: Pension Funds and Their Advisors (1990) 
Table 2.1 gives us a breakdown of the distribution of funds in each 
category of asset size. Less than 10% of funds have assets over £500 million 
whereas almost 50% of funds have assets below £50 million with the majority 
of these, ie 30%, holding assets less than £25 million. 
This reveals that although pension funds are the largest in asset size 
compared to the other three groups of institutional investors, the majority of 
funds are concentrated in the asset group holding less than £25 million. This 
implies that individually a pension fund may not have much scope for influence 
over the assets it chooses to invest in, but collectively there is much potential to 
influence economic activity. 
The table highlights the large number of pension funds in operation 
in the UK. It also reveals that they vary enormously in size and as a result of 
this their performance must also be very different. With such differences in size 
direct comparisons between fines may be difficult. 
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1iGURE 2.2 
INVESTMENTS BY SIZE OF PENSION FUND. 
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Figure 2.2 enables us to analyse which areas pension funds invest in 
according to their size. It is interesting to note that for all the fund sizes, with 
the exception of the smallest, over 50% of their investment is in UK equities. 
This evidence refutes criticisms, in particular by the Wilson Committee, that 
institutional investors were not aiding domestic industry preferring instead to 
send their resources overseas. 
Overseas equities are not negligible as they do constitute the second 
largest investment area and average 16.7% of total investment. It is rational, 
however, for pension funds to invest overseas because, as will be shown later, 
they are risk averse - preferring to hold a diverse portfolio in order to spread 
risk. Investing overseas reduces risk by avoiding domestic slumps and 
benefiting from the economic prosperity of other countries. 
The third most important area is fixed interest. UK fixed interest 
constitutes most of the fixed interest column. Next, in order of declining 
importance, is property. Here, once again, UK property constitutes the 
majority of the item with overseas property averaging at only 1.1%. 
Objectives 
Pension funds are established to provide income in the future to 
retired or disabled members of a firm or government agency and the primary 
objective of pension funds within this context is to maximise the rate of return 
by investments which involve an acceptable level of risk. They must take 
account of the nature of their liabilities. The liabilities tend to be long term thus 
an employee joining a firm at the age of twenty years will not, in general, 
become eligible for a pension for a further forty or forty-five years. The long- 
term nature of their liabilities gives pension funds an incentive to hedge against 
inflation. 
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Regulation and Accountability 
Pension funds are completely exempt from income and corporation 
tax on their investments. They do not, in general, have to take tax into account 
when making investment decisions. Pension funds have been severely 
criticised in the past for the lack of legislation surrounding them in the light of 
their considerable growth and size. They have not been accountable to their 
beneficiaries in the past and their level of disclosure does not reflect the volume 
of assets in their control. There was no comprehensive framework for 
monitoring their affairs. 
The announcement in the 1986 Budget of legislation to control 
pension fund surpluses was a start to the establishment of clearer guidelines. 
The main provisions of the Finance Act (1986) came into effect on 6th April 
1987. This should lead to a boost in performance because now pension funds 
in the workplace cannot count on all employees joining them as the latter now 
have the choice to go to an independent pension fund. This should lead to more 
disclosure of figures in an attempt to attract finance from employees. The 
competitiveness of the industry should increase and they should offer a better 
service than previously. 
It is compulsory for a set of rules to be issued to all staff concerning 
the fund in terms of its performance etc. In an employers scheme, the 
responsibility of investment rests with the Board of Trustees which must 
include a representation of the staff. The Board of Trustees decides who is 
responsible for investment decisions and if they see fit they may engage an 
outside investment manager. 
There have been two major pieces of legislation recently affecting 
pension funds - the Social Security Acts of 1985 and 1986. In addition, further 
legislation in the form of the Finance Act 1986 was introduced in order to 
control the level of pension funding in excess of liabilities. . 
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These new laws came about with the recognition by the government 
and others that pension schemes had become collectively a very powerful force 
in private sector employment. Pension funds favoured those who stayed in the 
same job at the expense of those that moved; hence discouraging job mobility. 
The other major factor influencing government intervention has been the 
enormous power pension funds have gained in the investment markets. 
Occupational schemes are an expression of collectivism. As with 
most collective enterprises control tends to be removed from the individual to 
the centre. In the case of pension funds control rests not so much with the 
trustees but with the institutions to whom the trustees have delegated the 
function of administration. This makes management of schemes even more 
removed from the understanding and control of individual employees, who are 
dependent on them for their long-term retirement saving. 
A major attack was launched on this form of collective retirement 
provision in a publication by the Centre of Policy Research entitled, `Personal 
and Portable Pensions for All' (1983). The twin themes of this paper were 
first, to allow employees to have the freedom to withdraw from their 
occupational schemes and make their own provisions for pensions; and 
second, to allow them also to have access to part of the value of their retirement 
benefits as capital before retirement. This objective was with a view to 
encouraging each person to become a `mini capitalist', controlling his or her 
own portfolio of Stock Exchange investments. 
The second objective was not taken up, although it has reappeared 
more recently in a non-pension context in the government's proposal for 
`Personal Equity Plans'. The first objective, however, was the central theme of 
the 1986 Social Security Act which introduced personal pension rights for all 
and which greatly widened the competition to provide such pensions - 
extending this to banks, unit trusts, building societies and other institutions. 
The Act of the preceding year took up the theme of personal pensions by 
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giving all employees the right to a transfer value instead of a preserved pension 
on leaving employment, and the right to have this invested in a personal 
contract of their choice. 
Turning to the issue of the disclosure of information; the trustees 
report is to be prepared annually. The Report is to be given on request to 
members and other beneficiaries, both current and prospective, and to any 
recognised trade union. Apart from this, only reasonable steps need to be taken 
to make known to members the availability of the annual report. In some cases 
this may mean that the report will be prepared, a note of its existence will 
appear on the noticeboard and it will then rest in the trustees file until the time 
comes to prepare the next one. 
How well pension funds perform is measured by two main 
independent companies: 
1) World Markets Company (WM). 
2) Combined Actuarial Performance Services (CAPS). 
They produce independent performance figures for most funds. 
WM have data on about 80% of all pension funds in the UK. They give these 
funds an idea of how they are performing against a weighted measure of all 
other pension funds broken down into many sub-sets in terms of size, type of 
fund etc. These figures are reported to the trustees who have to send annual 
reports to all their members. These reports must include performance figures. 
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2.2 INSURANCE COMPANIES 
The second largest group of institutional investors comprises of 
insurance companies. These fall into two main categories - those which are part 
of the general insurance group and those which specialise in Life Assurance. 
The second type are by far the largest in terms of asset size. 
There has been a significant and persistent rise in insurance 
company assets over the past two decades. The market appears highly 
competitive with over 100 life assurance companies alone. The companies 
charge vastly different prices revealing that a crucial feature of insurance may 
be consumer ignorance. Any company name that is familiar to the general 
public due to advertising etc, leads to people buying the product even if it is 
inferior. Therefore, it is imperative for insurance companies to have a strong 
responsible image. 
There are two types of insurance companies that need to be looked at 
seperately, and these are life assurance and general insurance. 
Life Assurance 
Life Assurance can be divided into three broad categories: term 
assurance, whole life and endowment assurance and annuities. Under a `term' 
policy the insurance company builds up a small fund during the early years 
when the probability of death is low and runs it down later. With a `whole life' 
policy the insurance company pays a capital sum on the death of the person 
insured. The premiums are much higher than for the term insurance because 
the company is committed to paying out the sum assured eventually, either at 
death or on maturity. 
Annuities provide the policy holder with a regular income for some 
defined period of time, often with a guarantee that a minimum number of 
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payments will be made even if the policy holder dies earlier. The Life 
Assurance company accumulates and holds a capital fund. This is gradually 
run down through annuity payments. 
To meet its legal commitments a Life Assurance company has a 
preference for assets whose money values at maturity are guaranteed. At the 
same time they wish to earn as high a yield as possible on their funds so they 
tend to hold a mixture of fixed interest and equity investments. 
Competition between Life Companies is often focused on the level 
of bonuses they have been able to pay in the past. Therefore, the company's 
investment performance is crucial to its competitive position. Also, since the 
bulk of Life Assurance funds in the UK reflect whole life, endowment or 
annuity business, the liabilities are mainly of a long term nature. This justifies 
the preference of companies for long term assets. 
General Insurance 
General insurance refers to fire, accident, insurance, health, 
property damage, general liability and pecuniary loss. It accounts for about one 
fifth of total insurance assets and is made up of shorter term liabilities than life 
assurance. 
Objectives 
Insurance companies have the common objective of trying to 
maximise expected yield. There are wide differences in the distribution of their 
funds and the investment policies they pursue. This reflects varying attitudes to 
risk, assessments of the yield potential of different types of asset and the nature 
of their liabilities etc. 
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The substantial assets held by insurers are invested so as to earn 
interest and capital gains. Investement income makes a vital contribution to an 
insurer's profits. This is particularly the case in long term business - life 
insurance, annuities and pensions. UK insurers -invest in a wide range of 
public and private sector securities, property, mortgages and cash. In the 
investment of insurance company funds, the overall aim is to be able to meet 
liabilities when they fall due while earning the highest possible yield without 
incurring too great a risk. 
In the case of general insurance, the major problem for an insurer is 
the unexpectedly large claim that might force him to sell investments at short 
notice; possibly at a loss. Insurers therefore concentrate on assets that can be 
easily sold at short notice, such as stocks and shares and avoid those that 
cannot, like property and land. However, these investments must also produce 
a satisfactory yield so that shareholders can be paid good dividends and any 
underwriting losses; ie. any excess of claims over payments; can be balanced 
by investment gains. 
In long-term insurance business the major concern is to earn a rate 
of interest greater than that used to calculate premiums; failure to do so could 
ultimately lead to insolvency. Since the vast bulk of life insurance business is 
savings-based, insurers must earn a rate of interest that allows them to 
compete with other forms of saving. The longer-term nature of their liabilities 
allows insurers to concentrate on longer-term investments as they are less 
concerned about the possibility of selling assets at short notice to pay claims. 
Therefore, they invest much of their assets in long-dated or undated 
government securities, equities and property. Other factors also affecting the 
investment policies of insurers include the aims and objectives of companies, 
political and economic constraints, solvency requirements and corporation and 
capital gains taxes. 
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Regulation and Accountability 
Insurance companies operate subject to both external supervision 
and a highly competitive environment. Insurance companies are limited 
companies so they must conform to certain statutory requirements as well as 
their own rules and regulations. These are imposed by bodies such as the 
British Insurance Association (BIA) and the Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI). Despite this they still have much discretion in their investments. 
Since the 1960's the UK government has considerably expanded the 
powers of the DTI. This was firstly to supervise both the entry of new 
insurance companies to write new classes of insurance and secondly to 
excercise more stringent control over the financial condition and behaviour of 
authorised insurers. Some of the measures have been necessary in order to 
comply with European Community (EC) insurance Directives aimed at 
bringing about a common EC insurance market. The supervisory rules are laid 
down in the Insurance Companies Act 1982 and various Regulations 
thereunder. 
All insurance benefited greatly from tax relief but in 1984 only Life 
Assurance remained exempt. Since the Financial Services Act 1986 insurance 
companies are in direct competition with other savings institutions. 
Insurance companies generally attempt to restrict their equity holding 
in one company to 5% - 10% of its issued share capital. However, this is 
increasingly difficult when investing in smaller companies. Traditionally, 
insurance companies have avoided taking an interest in the management of the 
companies in which they invest on the grounds of lack of time and type of staff 
required. However, given an increase in the size of individual holdings, if the 
performance of a firm deteriorates intervention may be the only possible 
solution given that disposing of the shares greatly depresses their price. 
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2.3 UNIT TRUSTS 
Unit trusts were set up to offer small investors the benefit of 
professional management and a spread of their risk. Unit Trusts are much 
smaller in asset size than both pension funds and insurance companies and are 
based on a shorter time horizon. A unit trust has to look at its performance on a 
daily or weekly basis and the results of that performance - the price of its units 
- are published in the national press. 
Their success lies in the fact that they are a relatively cheap way for a 
small investor to buy professional management and to spread risk. They have 
the flexibility of being open ended funds and so can be expanded or contracted 
in line with demand. 
Thus unit trusts are investment vehicles providing a means of 
participation in the stock market for people who have neither the time, the 
money nor the expertise to undertake direct investment in equities successfully. 
They also provide a route into specialist and overseas markets where direct 
investment often demands more time and expertise than investors or their 
financial advisers may possess. 
Size and Competitive Structure 
Table 2.3 shows the value of funds and the number of authorised 
unit trusts in five yearly periods from 1960-1989. In 1960 there were only 52 
trusts whereas by 1989 this number has risen to 1,399. The rise in the number 
of trusts has been more pronounced after 1980 where the number of trusts rose 
from 493 in 1980 to 806 in 1985 thus giving us reason to believe that 
competition has increased during the Thatcher era. 
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TABLE 2.3 - Unit Trusts 1960 - 1989 
Year Value (£m) Number of Trusts 
1960 201.4 51 
1965 521.9 121 
1970 1397.7 240 
1975 2512.4 353 
1980 4968.0 493 
1985 20307.5 806 
1989 52537.9 1399 
Source: Unit Trust Yearbook (1990) 
The value of funds has increased gradually until about 1980, when 
once again growth accelerated. Funds increased in value from £201.4m in 
1960 to £521.9m in 1965 and then up to £4,968m in 1980 at a rate where it 
more or less doubled every five years. However, in just five years it had risen 
to over four times its 1980 level and stands at £52,537.9m in 1989. Although, 
some of this rise can be accounted to inflation the table clearly illustrates the 
growing number of trusts generating more assets. 
Competition is fierce for unit trusts because they are competing for 
savings with other types of financial institutions e. g. building societies, 
insurance companies. They are also facing stronger competition from the rising 
number of new trusts coming into the industry. They are carefully scrutinised 
by the media and so must show high performance results to attract custom. 
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TABLE 2.31 - Number of Unit Trusts Ranked By Asset Size 
Assets (im) Number of Trusts % Distribution 
400+ 12 0.85 
200 - 400 41 2.9 
100 - 200 90 6.4 
50 - 100 161 11.5 
20 - 50 269 19.2 
0- 20 826 59.0 
TOTAL 1399 
Source: Unit Trust Yearbook (1990) 
Table 2.31 gives us a breakdown of the distribution of funds in each 
asset size. The asset size of the unit trusts is notably much smaller than that of 
pension funds in Table 2.1. Only 12 unit trusts hold assets exceeding £400 
million which is less than 1% of the total distribution. The number of funds in 
each asset size increases as the asset size declines and the majority of funds, 
i. e. 59%, hold assets below £20 million. This distribution highlights the 
number of unit trusts in the UK and also gives us a clearer picture as to the 
competitiveness of the unit trusts, particularly, the smaller ones. 
Regulation and Accountability 
Unit trusts have a greater level of disclosure than pension funds or 
insurance companies. The Unit Trust Association publish a yearbook giving 
brief details of past performance. Results of performance are published daily in 
newspapers and so there is pressure on trusts to attempt to outperform one 
another in the short run, or at least not get left behind. This is in order to keep 
existing clients and attract new ones. 
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Unit trusts are strictly controlled by the DTI. They are set up by a 
trust deed which is an agreement between the Trustees and the managers of the 
fund. The essential characteristics of the deed are that it lays down the rights 
and responsibilities of all concerned, provides provisions enabling new 
members to join, imposes maximum charges that can be made by the managers 
for administering the fund and prescribes the ways of calculating the buying 
and selling prices of units. 
The unit trust managers make day to day investment decisions 
necessary to the running of the trust and deal in units with the public. The 
Trustee - usually a major bank or insurance company - must also be approved 
by the DTI. 
Unit trust managers are allowed to invest only in securities quoted 
on a recognised Stock Exchange. They may also hold up to 25% of their funds 
in companies traded on Unlisted Securities Markets (USM). Since June 1983, 
unit trust managers have also been empowered to invest in traded options. 
Other constraints are imposed in the Trust deed to ensure that each fund has a 
sufficiently diversified spread of risk. The most important of these is that no 
holding may be acquired which would result; at the time of purchase; in the 
trust holding more than 5% of its value in one investment. 
The Financial Services Act 1986 affected unit trusts in its new 
framework. They are now be legally required to be authorised by one of the 
self-regulatory organisations (SROs), Recognised Professional Bodies 
(RPBs), or with the Securities and Investments Board (SIB) direct. The 
requirements set down by SROs are complex. They demand a much more 
detailed level of documentation than before of a company's activities whether 
selling or managing unit trusts as well as regular reporting. Companies have 
`compliance officers', whose job is to ensure that activities are carried out 
according to the rules. 
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An individual investing in a unit trust must make a selection before 
he places his money in the trust. He will be sent a performance report every six 
months and the information is publicly available in the Financial Times. 
However, his selection is only at the beginning of the period, after that he has 
no control or influence over his investment. The individual is not `locked in' to 
the trust as he does have the option to exit by selling his units. He may wish to 
exit in order to express his displeasure of the trusts' performance or because he 
may want to release his money for some other reason. 
It is difficult to assess which fund has superior performance when 
making a selection because the goal of the fund may be medium or long term 
and so the managers act with that in mind. Managers have their own strategies 
and research depending on the length they are working on. Therefore, the 
performance should not be judged on present performance figures because the 
goals of the managers may be orientated towards a longer time period. Funds 
cannot thus be directly compared and judgement should be made by looking at 
performance over the years. However, past performance is no guide to the 
future so there is an element of risk in every selection. 
The funds vary in the areas of investment; some are invested in 
European markets, others in the Far East etc. There are a variety of funds 
including futures, property, geared funds. There is a different element of risk 
attached to each type of investment e. g. investing in futures or options can be 
very risky, on the other hand the returns can be very high. It is difficult to 
predict with certainty. It is up to the individual to assess his personal 
philosophy before making a selection. 
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2.4 - INVESTMENT TRUSTS 
Objectives 
Investment trusts are limited companies formed under and controlled 
by the Companies Act and allied legislation. The amount of capital in issue at 
any one time is fixed and can only be increased with the consent of 
shareholders. Investment trusts, like unit trusts, are ways for savers to invest 
in the UK and overseas with a spread of risk and professional management at 
low cost. Unlike unit trusts, however, investment trusts have actually declined 
in their importance over the years. Their decline can be explained partly by 
competition from unit trusts and partly from difficulties for them to raise new 
funds. 
The primary objective of most investment trusts is to provide their 
shareholders over the medium and long term with a secure and increasing 
income and capital growth. To get a balanced growth of income and capital for 
their shareholders they tend to direct funds to established firms with a record of 
consistent and reasonable rates of return. As they do not have to retain liquidity 
for redemptions of their shares, trust managers can take a longer term view of 
returns on investment than would otherwise be the case. 
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Size and Competitive Structure 
TABLE 2.4 - Investment Trusts 1960 - 1987 
Year No. of Trusts UK Assets(%) Overseas Assets(%) 
1960 271 70.7 28.3 
1965 273 62.2 35.4 
1970 266 62.3 33.6 
1975 240 56.5 38.1 
1980 195 59.8 37.7 
1985 166 49.6 48.0 
1987 159 52.7 40.3 
Source: Investment Trust Yearbook (1989 - 1990) 
Investment trusts are competing for savings with other financial 
institutions, in particular unit trusts. Table 2.4 looks at five yearly periods from 
1960-1987 analysing the number of members, UK assets and total overseas 
assets. 
Membership has fallen steadily over the twenty five year period and 
has fallen from 271 in 1960 to 159 in 1987. This is mainly due to competition 
from unit trusts. UK assets have fallen as a percentage to total assets less 
current liabilities; although in 1985 there has been a slight reversal in the trend 
which has continued in 1987. Interestingly, total overseas assets have 
increased over the period although there has been a slight reversal in this trend 
from 1985. Out of the four groups of institutional investors analysed, 
investment trusts invest the largest percentage of their assets overseas. 
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Regulation and Accountability 
Investment trusts are limited companies and must abide by the 
statutory rules governing limited companies set out in the Companies Act. The 
shareholders are able to vote at the Annual General Meeting (AGM) and the 
investment trust manager is employed by a board of directors. Shareholders are 
entitled to annual reports from the directors regarding conduct. These reports 
list the financial accounts showing profits earned, dividends recommended, 
assets owned by the company and the extent of the companies liabilties. 
Information regarding performance statistics is published daily in the 
Finacial Times as well as in the annual Yearbook. Therefore, they find their 
investment performance under close market scrutiny. It is possible for 
individuals to sell their shares and so exit is possible. 
2.5 - INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS COLLECTIVELY 
It has been established that institutional investors are organisations 
which raise funds from individuals and corporations. They invest as major 
players in the stock market using professional management and operating 
within the constraints provided by their own articles and trust deeds as well as 
tax and legal considerations. The aim of institutional investors is to maximise 
the income of the fund and by holding a diversified portfolio they eliminate the 
specific risk attached to the shares of individual companies. 
Institutional investors are primarily risk averse organisations 
because they are dealing with other people's money. In order to attract more 
funds and expand existing ones they need to make investments which will not 
be detrimental to their image of being safe and reliable. For this reason they 
tend to avoid investing in small companies and new ventures. Another reason 
is the accompanying transaction costs may not be worth incurring. They also 
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tend to limit the maximum size of any holding because the larger the size the 
more difficult it is to dispose of the shares in the face of poor performance. 
Few institutional investors buy and sell securities in small companies because 
deciding on acquisitions and sales and monitoring the performance of 
companies whose shares are held are both time-consuming and costly 
activities. Their strategy is generally to analyse past performance of companies 
and to invest in those companies which are large, stable and successful. 
Table 2.5 gives a breakdown of the institutional investors net 
transactions in selected assets for the years 1981-1987. The two most 
important categories are pension funds and insurance companies. 
In this period all the groups have reduced their transactions in UK 
land, property and ground rents. Unit trusts have tended to invest quite 
heavily in overseas shares with the exception of 1987. The other groups have 
tended to invest more in UK ordinary shares. Pension funds have increased in 
each area apart from UK land, property and ground rents. Pension funds have 
increased holdings significantly in UK ordinary shares, particularly in 1987. In 
this year they actually had high negative amounts in government securities and 
overseas shares. 
Insurance companies are divided here into two broad categories - life 
assurance and general insurance. There has been a decline in long term funds 
in British Government Securities and to a lesser extent in UK land, property 
and ground rents. There has been a rise in ordinary shares both UK and 
overseas; with the exception of 1987 in the case of overseas. General 
insurance companues have tended to be more volatile in their transactions but 
have remained strongest in British Government securities. They have increased 
transactions in 1986 and 1987 for both UK and overseas ordinary shares. 
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TABLE 2.5 
TRANSACTIONS IN ASSETS. (im) 
YEAR PENSION LIFE GENERAL INVEST. UNIT 
FUNDS ASSUR. INSUR. TRUSTS TRUSTS 
GOVERN ENT ER TIE 
1981 2025 2208 704 -57 103 1982 1362 1841 65 -7 90 1983 2688 2092 288 127 122 
1984 2201 2445 -23 - 54 1985 2705 1890 187 67 22 
1986 1361 770 927 13 46 
1987 -2007 1145 688 432 87 
RDi RY HARE. 
1981 2004 952 111 -253 33 1982 2099 1357 -16 -533 161 1983 1604 885 -2 -183 248 1984 2651 1258 -3 -296 511 1985 3506 2259 -107 117 1074 1986 3619 2335 41 138 1743 
1987 7950 2885 302 264 3631 
OVERSEM ORDINARY SHARES. 
1981 1672 627 53 163 277 
1982 1888 947 -39 369 217 1983 1299 826 10 210 736 
1984 317 272 -15 -317 185 1985 2041 1047 -6 126 1002 1986 2594 804 80 -74 2357 1987 -732 -169 84 -898 -59 
LANDX ROPERTY A ND R 
1981 843 975 99 12 108 
1982 797 976 83 4 57 
1983 567 799 46 -3 -10 1984 674 707 37 2 47 
1985 485 803 12 1 5 
1986 379 823 22 -4 -101 1987 133 832 10 26 -522 
SOURCE " CSO FINANCIAL STATISTICS H. M O 
(VARIOUS). 
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Investment trusts have acted less predictably than the other three 
types of investor and have actually declined in importance over the years. The 
table shows that they are inclined to invest mostly in British Government 
securities and UK ordinary shares. They are performing particularly badly in 
overseas shares. Unit trusts have declined in British Government securities and 
UK land, property and ground rents but are doing particularly well in ordinary 
shares in the UK and also overseas, with the exception of 1987. 
Overall the institutions do tend to favour UK ordinary shares. This 
gives evidence refuting the point raised by the Wilson Committee (1980) who 
criticised them for investing money overseas rather than in the domestic 
economy and thus being detrimental to the UK's economic recovery. This table 
shows that the majority of their net acquisitions are, in fact, in the UK. 
Indeed, it is rational for institutional investors to favour overseas 
investment to some extent because the prospects may be better than the UK 
e. g. if the pound is over-valued relative to other major currencies. An 
additional benefit is that overseas investment leads to diversification and 
reduces the risk of slumps in the domestic economy (Bain (1983)). 
2.6 - SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has described pension funds, insurance companies, 
unit and investment trusts individually in terms of their size, the competitive 
structure within which they operate, their aims and their accountability to 
policyholders. It has emphasised how the four groups differ from each other. 
This was important to establish because, although they are often referred to as 
a group assuming they act homogeneously, in reality this is not the case. 
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Pension funds are the largest of the four groups and hold about 30% 
of UK equities in total. They tend to be very large in size with 8.6% of pension 
funds holding assets in excess of £500m. There are, however, significant 
variations in size as 30% of pension funds held assets below £25m. 
Consequently, it is not possible to compare pension funds directly with each 
other. 
The liabilities of pension funds tend to be long-term and they benefit 
from tax relief. This means that they pay no tax on capital gains when dealing 
in shares and this can encourage their attention on short-term results rather than 
long-term investment. At present there is also very little accountability to their 
policyholders and so further disclosure is recommended. 
Insurance companies are divided into two categories, concerned 
respectively with life assurance and general insurance. Life assurance 
companies account for about 90% of the total business and general insurance 
the remaining 10%. There is a wide difference in the distribution of funds and 
the investment policies pursued depending on their attitudes to risk, assessment 
of the yield potential of assets and the nature of the liabilities. They tend to 
invest mainly in equity, property and mortgages and are under greater 
regulation than pension funds yet they still have much discretion over their 
investments. life assurance also benefits from tax relief. 
Unit trusts are much smaller in size than the above two institutional 
investors and they are a way for the small investor to benefit from professional 
management and to spread risk at relatively little cost. They are in a very 
competitive environment with about 1400 trusts, however, they tend to be 
relatively smaller in size with about 60% of trusts holding assets below £20m. 
There is a greater level of disclosure as performance is monitored in their own 
league tables and by the national press. 
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Investment trusts are similar to unit trusts in terms of size but they 
have actually been declining in number over the years. They compete fiercely 
amongst themselves and with unit trusts because they too have their results 
disclosed. However, they are under less pressure for short-term performance 
than the others because they are closed-ended firms and so one type of 
shareholder will be replaced with another. They have greater disclosure 
requirements because they are limited companies and so must submit annual 
company reports and hold A. G. M's. They hold a larger percentage of assets 
overseas than any of the other groups. 
It was important to establish the differences between these 
institutional investors because it serves to provide a greater understanding of 
their preferences for particular assets. These preferences vary to a large extent 
depending on the nature of their liabilities and also to the risk attached to the 
various types of assets. These preferences will be discussed further in chapters 
3and6. 
This chapter has shown how institutional investors differ from one 
another. There are varying degrees of pressure they face. Although the nature 
of their businesses differs there are similarities between them in that they are 
the intermediaries through which people knowingly or unknowingly invest - 
knowingly in the case of unit and investment trusts and unknowingly through 
pension funds and insurance companies. These institutional investors cover a 
wide range of activities and they spread into every facet of the economy. 
Collectively the institutional investors are growing in size and this 
trend is likely to continue. They invest mostly in UK equities, government 
securities, overseas assets and property. They tend also to be risk averse by 
nature and so cautious in their investments preferring to diversify in order to 
reduce risk. This chapter has shown the operational structure of the 
institutional investors. The following chapter analyses their impact on the 
market. 
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CHAPTER 3- THE STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE 
OWNERSHIP IN THE UK. 
This chapter looks at the structure of corporate ownership in the 
UK. It is primarily concerned with looking at the reasons why there is a higher 
degree of involvement by institutional investors in some companies than in 
others. It is important to establish the broad forces that influence ownership 
structure because, amongst other things, institutional investors have often been 
criticised for investing in the larger, more established companies rather than 
new ventures or small companies (Wilson Report (1980)). As institutional 
investors are important holders of equities in UK companies systematic 
investigation of the issue is essential. 
This chapter is an empirical study which uses a sample of 278 UK 
companies in order to investigate variations in ownership structure. It is a 
statistical study for the year 1989. The chapter is set out as follows: The first 
section reviews related studies on ownership concentration and shows how the 
present analysis fits in with the past studies. It introduces and sets out the 
hypotheses to be tested empirically. Section two explains the data and sets out 
the theoretical model. The sample of firms used in the study is discussed and 
the variables included justified. In section three the methodology is discussed 
and the results are presented. Finally, in the conclusion the main findings are 
summed up and the implications of the results are discussed in the context of 
the past studies in the area. 
A firm's performance reflects factors affecting both its objective 
function and the constraints it faces, respectively internal and external 
influences. The former include internal organisation variables (control type, 
organisation form) and factors modifying incentives (ownership concentration, 
risk); the latter include product market influences (market concentration, entry 
barriers, oligopolistic interdependence, technology), capital market influences 
(the cost of capital, the market for corporate control), life cycle effects and 
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labour market influences. Some variables may operate through both internal 
and external effects so this dichotomy is not complete. 
Ownership structure is hypothesised to affect behaviour in two ways: 
i) directly by its effect on the incentives facing share owners and 
ii) indirectly through the distribution of power (which determines control) 
within the voting body comprising all the shareholders. We include variables to 
measure both effects within the specification: ownership concentration and 
control type. 
Attempts will be made to explain any variation in the structure of 
ownership by considering the advantages and disadvantages to the firms' 
shareholders of greater diffuseness in ownership structure. The implications of 
this diffuse structure are quite significant. In firms where ownership is 
dispersed it may be very difficult for any one shareholder to dominate decision 
taking. This may give management the discretion to pursue goals other than 
those of the owners of the firm and subsequently company performance may 
be affected because of the conflict of interest between managers and owners. 
There are constraints, however, to limit managers diverging too far 
from shareholders' wishes. Capital market constraints exist and tend to work 
through two mutually reinforcing mechanisms. ' Firstly, there is a direct 
limitation on management discretion through their accountability to 
shareholders. It is assumed here that larger shareholders monitor company 
performance continuously and show their displeasure by using their voting 
power to force changes in company policy or, in the extreme case, to replace 
existing top level management with one more acceptable to them. 
Behind this institutional threat lies the second constraint. An increase 
in share concentration may lead to a takeover should the share price fall low 
enough or the threat prove ineffective. Takeovers tend to be accompanied by a 
Leech, D (1985) 
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dismissal of the target's management and so the threat may serve as a 
disciplinary measure. These constraints highlight the potential importance of a 
concentrated shareholding structure. 
Another force affecting the ownership structure is control potential. 
This is the gain in wealth that can be achieved through more effective 
monitoring of managerial performance by a firms' owners. Monitoring is 
necessary because of the divergence of interests between owners and 
managers2 . Institutional 
investors are in a potentially strong position to 
monitor management because they are large, organised and collectively usually 
hold a significant proportion of the company's shares. 
This would imply that the payoff for maintaining tighter control is 
higher for these larger shareholders. It would also imply that larger firms 
should thus have a more concentrated ownership structure in order to monitor 
management more effectively. However, this may not be the case. 
Shareholders, particularly institutional investors, may not wish to devote the 
time and resources to monitor the management. Institutional investors are 
investors not managers; ie. they are concerned with investing their assets in 
order to get as high a return as possible given the nature of their liabilities. 
Their job is not to manage the firm on a day to day basis and so if they are 
concerned with the firms' performance they will tend to meet informally with 
the managers in order to discuss the issue (see Midgley (1974) and Cadbury 
(1990)). 
The two main studies on which this present empirical piece of work 
is based on are a U. S study by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and a recent U. K 
study by Leech and Leahy (1989). They test very similar hypotheses but come 
out with differing results. The main findings of these papers will be 
summarised. 
2 See Tirole (1987) for problems of 'hidden action' and 'hidden information'. 
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The first study by Demsetz and Lehn analyses the advantages and 
disadvantages to the firm's shareholders of greater diffuseness in ownership 
structure. The main disadvantage is shirking by owners of their control 
responsibilities. Owners have a greater capacity to shirk in large firms because 
the costs of their shirking, i. e the lower performance of the firm, are borne by 
all owners in proportion to the percentage of shares they own. This, they 
argue, should lead to a greater concentration of ownership. 
They argue, however, that advantages must also exist because 
diffuse ownership structures are so widespread and so the diversification of 
shares must be consistent with value maximisation. Otherwise it is rational to 
keep ownership concentrated. The goal of value maximisation causes a firm 
structure to be diffuse. The motive may be to spread risk. 
In Demsetz and Lehn's view there are three general forces affecting 
ownership structure: firm size, control potential and systematic regulation. 
They argue that the larger the firm the higher the price of ownership and thus 
the greater the risk - this leads to a more diffuse structure. 
Secondly, the control potential is the gain in wealth due to a greater 
monitoring of managers. The `noisier' a firm's environment, the greater the 
advantages of maintaining tighter control. `Noise' refers to unstable prices, 
unstable shares, unstable technology etc. They expect to find a positive 
relationship between the noisiness of a firms' environment and ownership 
concentration. Regulation provides subsidised monitoring and discipline and 
thus leads to a reduction in ownership concentration. This implies a greater 
diffuseness of ownership in regulated industries. 
They add a fourth hypothesis concerning the amenity potential of a 
firms' output. Here shareholders derive a utility in influencing the type of 
goods produced by the firm. There are non-pecuniary benefits of the power to 
deploy resources to suit one's personal preferences. This is not too convincing 
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an argument especially for institutional investors who are concerned with the 
performance of the company and are unlikely to invest in a company in order to 
influence the type of good produced. There may be an element of truth for 
individuals who invest in certain companies because they are producing goods 
which are well known household names. 
The principal results of Demsetz and Lehn's empirical study of 511 
US firms are as follows: 
1. Their measures of instability are positively related to ownership 
concentration. 
2. The size of the fine is negatively related to ownership concentration. 
3. The dummy for systematic regulation indicates that the average 
concentration of ownership for the regulated firms is significantly less than for 
other firms. 
4. Media firms have a higher ownership concentration on average than other 
firms. 
These results are as predicted by their model. 
The second main study is a recent analysis of UK firms by Leech 
and Leahy (1989). They too treat the ownership structure as endogenous and 
attempt to provide empirical evidence of the factors which determine the wide 
variation in observed patterns of ownership among large companies. 
They hypothesise that ownership structure depends on three broad 
factors: firm size, the riskiness of the firms environment and the age of the 
firm. The first two factors are the same as mentioned in the US study but age is 
a new factor. 
Leech and Leahy expect firm size to be negatively related to 
ownership concentration for the same reasons outlined in the Demsetz and 
Lehn paper. Risk, as characterised by the instability of prices, technology and 
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market shares, is predicted to encourage the concentration of ownership. The 
arguments, again, are the same as for the previous study. The main difference 
between the two studies is that Leech and Leahy introduce age of the firm as an 
important factor. They expect a negative relationship between age and the 
concentration of ownership. The reasoning behind this is that as time passes 
there is a lower concentration of ownership as blocks of shares held by 
families and individuals are fragmented through sales, marriage, inheritance 
etc. leading to an eventual loss of control. 
In their empirical analysis they use the interval since the company 
went public as the age effect. This is because they are interested in the 
distribution of shareholdings rather than the actual . age of the 
firm. Their results 
are as follows: 
1. There is a negative relationship between firm size and concentration of 
ownership. 
2. There is a negative relationship between risk and concentration of 
ownership. They found no evidence that firm specific risk is associated with 
greater concentration of ownership. This is at odds with the previous study 
which found a positive and significant relationship between the two, and at 
odds with what was predicted by Leech and Leahy themselves. The result, 
however, is consistent with risk averse diversification by investors. This result 
also highlights differences between UK and US firms. 
3. Age has the expected negative sign but was found to be insignificant. 
One point of concern with Leech and Leahy's study is that they used 
ownership data from `Who owns what on the London Stock Exchange? '. This 
source provides subscribers with regularly updated information about share 
ownership and changes in it. The criteria for inclusion were derived from the 
main purpose of the service, which was to enhance the marketability of certain 
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shares. This implies that Leech and Leahy's sample of companies may consist 
of those which were seen by stockbrokers as not having attracted sufficient 
market attention. 
The present study overcomes this difficulty by introducing a new 
source from which the present sample of firms were obtained, namely Jordan's 
Shareholder Service which will be discussed in more detail below. It also 
differs from the two studies described above as it looks specifically at 
institutional investors and at the factors which attract them to particular firms. 
Another point of originality in this study is the analysis of individual industrial 
sectors. This study looks at nine non-financial industrial sectors and so sheds 
light on the differences in the ownership structures of differing market 
environments. 
Although this study is most similar to the above two studies, it is 
important to look at related studies. 
3.1 RELATED STUDIES. 
It is assumed that large firms are the norm in advanced industrial 
countries and that groups of large institutional investors collectively hold a 
significant proportion of the firms' shares. However, it is important to 
remember that political and legal constraints exist. Decisions are not based 
solely on financial considerations but on powerful forces such as law and 
politics. In the US, for example, law restricts institutional investors from 
holding large equity blocks and from networking the small blocks they do own 
(Roe (1990)). Laws have restricted the equity holdings of institutional 
investors - mutual funds and insurance companies generally can only own 
small portions of any one firms' equity. Pension funds own stock but they too 
face restrictions. It is debatable, however, as to how effective these laws are 
once enforced. In the UK, too, institutional investors tend to hold less than 5% 
of equity in any one company. 
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The fragmentation of institutional capital caused owners' power to 
shift primarily to managers in the modern public corporation. The legal system 
limited control by institutional investors in three main ways. Firstly, 
prohibition of stock ownership (ie. US banks); secondly, fragmentation of 
institutional investors and thirdly, fragmentation of institutional portfolios. 
Berle and Means (1932) introduced the concept of the divorce of 
ownership from control. Some authors following them have argued that the 
distribution of ownership has important implications for the efficiency and 
strategic development of firms (Marris (1964); Williamson (1964); Galbraith 
(1967); Pfeffer and Salancik (1978)). Others have argued that the distribution 
of ownership is irrelevant (Jensen and Meckling (1976); Demsetz (1983); 
Fama (1983); Demsetz and Lehn (1985); ). Research on this issue has yielded 
conflicting results (Cubbin and Leech (1983)). 
An important issue when discussing the structure of ownership is 
the amount of equity holdings by managers themselves. Most managers hold a 
proportion of shares in their firm. This weakens the separation of ownership 
from control arguments because, in this case, the managers are the owners as 
well, and so would gain utility from rising share prices and the profitability of 
the firm, as well as increases in their salaries. The relative importance of this 
depends on the proportion of shares they hold, and what percentage of their 
compensation is made related to the performance of the company. If it is a 
negligible amount they may shirk in their ownership responsibilities and try to 
maximise goals other than firms profitability. 
However, in the UK a picture emerges of a board of directors 
dominated by a majority of inside executives, who have typically spent the 
bulk of their careers in the company they now direct. However, the pattern of 
corporate share-ownership in the UK is such that a small number of 
institutional investors recur as significant owners and controllers of stock. 
These major institutional investors are also represented on the boards of 
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industrial companies. They are, therefore, potentially able to play a key role in 
the determination of corporate behaviour. This is so in terms of their influence 
over the composition of remuneration packages, and over key executive 
appointments, as well as in terms of influencing the outcomes of takeover bids. 
In addition, a number of cases were identified where directors were significant 
holders of stock which casts doubt on any conclusion that motivational conflict 
between these directors and their shareholders must inevitably arise. 
A study by Singh and Harianto (1989) examines some attributes of 
the top management team, corporate ownership structure and board 
composition as the determinant of the magnitude of golden parachutes. The 
two parameters of golden parachutes - coverage (number of executives) and 
size (number of years' compensation equivalent) - can be viewed as indices of 
contingent compensation provided to top management teams in the event of a 
change in control. This contingent compensation can reduce the possibility of 
entrenchment of management when faced with a takeover bid that does serve 
the shareholders. 
Firms with high levels of management-owned stock and relatively 
diffused public-stock ownership tend to obtain a wide dispersion of contractual 
protection by covering larger numbers of executives. They argue that there is a 
complimentary effect of incentive alignment and influence processes: these 
executives exercise their influence on the board to spread the contractual 
protection, but do not demand a large contracted individual golden parachute 
payment because they are already protected by potential gains in their stock 
value in the event of a takeover. Greater levels of non-management owned 
stock in the hands of institutional stockholders delimit the number of 
executives covered by golden parachutes. 
The work by Dickson (1991) was motivated by the paradigm that 
higher profits derived from higher prices are associated with higher 
concentration. Demsetz (1973) argued that long-lived cost differences among 
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firms within an industry lead to low-cost firms growing relative to others. The 
result is both higher concentration and higher profits for these larger firms. 
This implied that the positive relationship between profit and concentration 
occurred because lower costs led to both higher concentration and higher 
profits. Dickson (1991) looks at the relationship between industry profit and 
seller concentration in Canada. He concludes that in aggregate for Canadian 
manufacturing, the price-cost margin regressions do not show that high 
concentration is harmful. 
It is important to look at the ownership structure of a firm because 
according to Lloyd, Hand and Modani (1987) manager-controlled firms do not 
pursue the same objectives as owner-controlled firms. Their research leads to 
four main conclusions. Firstly, manager-controlled companies have a 
significantly greater tendency to engage in conglomerate mergers than do firms 
with strong owner control; secondly, the income streams of manager-controlled 
firms are more diversified than those of companies with strong owner control; 
thirdly, individual owners tend to monitor their managers closely even if their 
ownership interest is relatively small, while institutional investors that are 
owners do not monitor closely unless their interest is large, and fourthly, the 
value-to-sales ratio is lower for manager-controlled companies than for owner- 
controlled ones. 
Brickley, Lease and Smith (1988) indicate that institutional investors 
and other blockholders vote more actively on anti-takeover amendments than 
non-blockholders, and opposition by institutional investors is greater when the 
proposal appears to harm shareholders. Their evidence suggests that in the US 
institutional investors that are less subject to management influence, such as 
mutual funds, foundations and public employee pension funds, are more likely 
to oppose management than banks, insurance companies and trusts which 
frequently derive benefits from lines of business under management control. 
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In a paper about capital markets and corporate control Franks and 
Mayer (1990) were concerned with the way in which capital markets exert 
control over the management and operations of firms. Corporate control is 
mainly associated with takeovers. In the UK and US takeovers are regarded as 
a central function of stock markets. The takeover process acts as a discipline on 
firms allowing control to be transferred from inefficient to efficient 
management and encouraging the convergence of interests between 
management and shareholders. Elsewhere in Europe, less emphasis is placed 
on the role of takeovers in changing corporate control. 
Their paper compares the relation between capital markets and 
corporate control in France, Germany and the UK. What emerges is a very 
different pattern of both ownership and control changes between the three 
countries due mainly to differences in regulation. Hostile takeovers, buy-outs 
and buy-ins are higher in the UK than in France or Germany. Levels of 
executive dismissal are also higher in the UK. The UK system is directed 
towards the promotion of markets. As part of that process, close links between 
investors and firms are discouraged by laws relating to insider dealing and the 
exploitation of the minority shareholders. Arrangements limiting the 
transferability of ownership and control are restricted by stock exchange and 
takeover codes. With limited direct investor involvement and with few 
impediments to transfers of ownership and control, the correction of 
managerial failure in the UK would be expected to be associated with changes 
in ownership. Their evidence from a sample of takeovers confirms that 
prediction. The advantage of the UK approach is that it permits the correction 
of ex ante managerial failure. The drawback is that it undermines the 
implementation of informal implicit agreements. 
Hirschey and Zaima (1989) find that the generally favourable 
assessment of corporate sell-off decisions is most apparent for closely held 
firms where insider net-buy activity is prevalent during the prior six month 
period. Insider trader activity and ownership structure information are used by 
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the market in the characterisation of sell off decisions as favourable or 
unfavourable for growth. The significance of this is that the ownership 
structure of a firm conveys information that is used by investors in their sell- 
off decision. 
Gilson (1990) looked at the changes in the ownership structure and 
control when firms default. Changes take place if a firm becomes bankrupt. He 
found evidence that common stock ownership becomes more concentrated with 
large blockholders and less with corporate insiders when a firm files for 
bankruptcy. From his study of 111 publicly traded US firms that on average 
only 46% of incumbent directors remain when bankruptcy or debt restructuring 
ends. Directors who resign hold significantly fewer seats on other boards 
following their departure. Overall, his results suggest that corporate default 
leads to significant changes in the ownership of firms' residual claims and in 
the allocation of rights to manage corporate resources. 
According to Pitelis (1987) controlling shareholders prefer high 
retention rates and low dividends, to expand without loss of control. Non- 
controlling shareholders, especially those who `own' shares indirectly 
(through compulsory pension schemes etc), may be forced to save more than 
they would otherwise choose, if they cannot offset corporate retentions by 
borrowing. Pitelis also examines the issue of the separation of ownership from 
control in the modern corporation. He refutes the neoclassical argument that 
each shareholder exacts some control over corporate capital due to their ability 
to sell the stock. He argues that significant market imperfections including the 
difficulties small stockholders have in `piercing the corporate veil' and the 
limited control most employees have over their invested pension funds. He 
refutes the managerialist belief that the dilution of stock ownership has severed 
control from ownership of corporate capital. Instead, he argues that the 
capitalist as a major stockholder has retained control of the corporation while 
the more numerous small stockholders wield little influence. 
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The next section will introduce the mathematical model to be tested: 
3.2 - THEORETICAL MODEL. 
The model to be tested is based on those of Demsetz and Lehn and 
Leech and Leahy. 
The model is set up as follows: 
Y=f (Xi ..... X9) 
Y=a+bX1+ cX2 + ..... +jX9+ u 
Where Y is the concentration of ownership, 
X1 ..... X9 are the independent variables 
a is the constant term 
b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j are the coefficients of the independent 
variables. 
u is the error term. 
The properties of the error term follow the standard assumptions of 
a zero mean, constant variance, no serial correlation and a normal distribution. 
There is no correlation between the variables and the error term. The residuals 
are orthogonal to the explanatory variables. 
The sample of firms were chosen from Jordans Shareholder Service 
from listed companies only. The firms were randomly selected on the basis of 
the sectoral divisions in the Financial Times. There are 278 firms in the sample 
for the year 1989 and they are selected from nine non-financial industrial 
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sectors with a significant institutional investor representation (see Appendix 
A). Financial constraints prevented the use of the whole sample. Table 3.1 
shows the industrial sectors and how many firms have been selected from each 
sector. 
TABLE 3.1 - SAMPLE OF FIRMS. 
INDUSTRIAL SECTOR NUMBER OF FIRMS 
BEERS, WINES & SPIRITS 16 
CHEMICALS 21 
DRAPERY 29 
LEISURE 30 
FOOD 33 
PAPER, PRINTING & ADVERTISING 34 
PROPERTY 30 
ELECTRICALS 39 
ENGINEERING 46 
TOTAL 278 
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DESCRIPTION OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
SIZE VARIABLES: 
XI: SALES (%) - Sales figures are taken from company accounts. 
Percentage change from previous year. 
X2: PRETAX PROFITS (%) - These figures are taken from company 
accounts. Percentage change from previous year. 
X3: PROFIT MARGIN (%) - Profit before tax / Turnover. 
X4: RETURN TO SHAREHOLDER FUNDS (%) - Profit before tax/ 
shareholder funds. 
INSTABILITY VARIABLES. 
X5 : LIQUIDITY RATIO - Current assets - stock /- current liabilities. 
X6: GEARING (%) -( Long term liabilities + Bank Overdraft) / (Share 
Capital + Reserves). 
X7 : BETA (%) - Coefficient of systematic risk. The average sensitivity of 
the shares in the industry to general market movements. 
X8 : SD (%) - For the F. T. A. Indices, this is the variability (standard 
deviation) of the returns on the index. For the industry averages, this is the 
average variability of the share prices in the industry. 
X9: ANNUAL ACTUAL RETURN (%) - The percentage capital 
appreciation plus dividend yield over the past year. 
SOURCES: X1 ... X6 " JORDANS SHAREHOLDER SERVICE. 
X7 ... X9 - RISK MEASUREMENT SERVICE - 
LONDON BUSINESS SCHOOL 
All variables are for the year 1989. 
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INSTABILITY OF A FIRM'S ENVIRONMENT (RISK) 
The riskiness of the firm's environment may have an influence on its 
ownership structure because of its effect on managerial discretion. Where it is 
characterised by stability of prices, technology, market shares etc the firm's 
performance is easily monitored by shareholders. Where there is a lot of 
uncertainty the behaviour of management has a greater impact on performance, 
in that frequent changes in the environment require frequent adjustments to the 
deployment of the firm's productive assets, and is thus more difficult for an 
outsider to monitor. Shareholders therefore have a greater incentive to exercise 
control in this case and this would lead us to expect a positive relationship 
between a measure of risk and ownership control. On the other hand, we 
would expect risk averse investors to diversify away from relatively risky 
assets and therefore we would expect a negative relationship between risk and 
concentration. 
Different measures of financial risk have been included based on the variability 
of returns on the company's shares: 
i) SD, the standard deviation of the rate of return, which measures TOTAL 
RISK. 
ii) a measure of systematic risk, BETA. Beta is estimated from the market 
model as the coefficient in a regression of its rate of return on the market 
average and it expresses the sensitivity of the expected rate of return to general 
market conditions. Systematic risk cannot be diversified away and the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model predicts that investors in shares having a high beta will 
seek compensation for the high risk in a high expected rate of return. 
While systematic risk is relevant to shareholders, it is total risk 
which matters to managers since their commitment to the firm is total and they 
are unable to offset that high risk by diversifying their employment. These two 
variables, total risk - SD and systematic risk - BETA, are both included as 
explanatory variables on the grounds that they are relevant to different groups 
within the firm and therefore likely to influence behaviour in different ways. 
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iii) Annual actual return. The greater the return implies that the stock market 
has revalued the company and it is better now than it was the previous year. 
iv) Liquidity ratio -A high liquidity ratio implies that the firm is able to meet its 
liabilities in the short term. A low liquidity ratio implies that the company is 
struggling. However, a high liquidity ratio means that there are fewer income 
earning assets and and so may be less attractive to institutional investors. 
v) Gearing ratio - increases the financial risk of the company. The higher the 
gearing ratio the greater the financial risk of the company. The gearing ratio 
will vary depending on the type of company and the industry it is in. However, 
there is scope for greater potential returns in an upswing market. 
FIRM SIZE 
Size influences performance in a number of ways determining the 
extent of product market and capital market constraints. The level of output 
itself raises entry barriers through economies of scale. Market share determines 
the market power of the firm given entry barriers and hence the scope for 
managerial discretion exists. This effect is picked up by company sales. Size 
also has capital market effects since larger companies have a greater capacity 
for financing expansion by internally generated funds. They are also able to 
raise finance more easily through the capital market and there is a better 
secondary market in their shares. Size also has life cycle effects since 
opportunities for growth are likely to be greater for smaller firms. 
The larger the firm the greater the market value of a given fraction of 
ownership and therefore the greater the cost to investors of a controlling 
shareholding. Moreover, risk averse investors would wish to avoid holding a 
large proportion of their portfolio in a single asset. The probabilistic voting 
model suggests that it is possible that control may be obtained by a reducing 
fraction of ownership if ownership is sufficiently dispersed (Foley (1990). We 
would therefore expect to find a negative relationship between size and 
ownership concentration. 
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1. Trading profit margin(%). 
2. Rate of return on shareholders capital(%). 
3. Rate of growth of total sales (% p. a) 
4. Pretax profits(%) - The higher they are the better the company is 
performing. 
This set of variables are taken as the arguments of a management 
utility function in which pure managers benefit from rapid growth and high 
salaries and pure owners are interested in profits. The approach adopted is 
based on the use of a general framework in which both profit maximisation and 
pure managerial behaviour, such as growth maximisation, are nested 
hypotheses. Variables 1,2 and 3 above are higher in firms classified as owner 
controlled. 
The model is incomplete in the sense that it has not taken account of 
diversification, age, export intensity, capital intensity of technology. 
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DESCRIPTION OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES. 
Y: OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION. 
The shareholders for each firm were subdivided into four groups : 
institutional investors, private individuals, other plc's and nominees. There 
were difficulties in establishing the identity of nominees in some cases. 
Wherever the nominees were named they were put in the category in which 
they belonged. The category `institutional investors' included pension funds, 
insurance companies, unit trusts and investment trusts. It also included any 
other financial institution eg banks etc. This was because in the majority of the 
institutional investors it was the investment arm of their organisation and thus 
did fall into the above category. This was done for the largest 5 and 20 
shareholders in each firm. This was a workable outer limit and that used for 
previous studies to which our study is comparable. 
It was essential to subdivide the shareholders into classes because 
each group of shareholders differs in their incentives and motivations, and only 
by separating the groups can a meaningful representation be made. 
There are, consequently, four main classifications of shareholder 
groups: 
1, the percentage of shares held by the top 5 shareholders (T5), 
2, the percentage of shares held by the top 20 shareholders (T20), 
3, the percentage of shares held by the top 5 institutional investors (115) 
4, the percentage of shares held by the top 5 institutional investors and 
nominees, where the nominees have not been named (IIN5). 
70 
The pattern of ownership for each of the classifications described 
above is shown in Table 3.2. The figures are of the total sample of firms 
collectively. 
TABLE 3.2 - THE STRUCTURE OF OWNERSHIP 
T5 T20 115 IINS 
MAX 92.78 97.73 60.25 81.02 
MIN 4.23 9.91 1.41 3.39 
MEAN 35.86 58.24 14.96 19.80 
S. D 17.67 17.63 7.71 10.05 
(All figures are in percentages) 
The table highlights the relative importance of institutional investors 
in our sample of firms (115). The maximum percentage of shares held in any 
one firm by the top 5 institutional investors is 60.25% which gives some idea 
of their potential power if they own two thirds of the firm. This share rises to 
81.02% when the top 5 institutional investors and unidentified nominees 
(IIN5) are taken together. These figures may seem too high and may not be 
representative of the majority of the firms in our sample, however, the mean 
figures on average show that the top 5 institutional investors hold just under 
15% of shares in any one firm. This figure rises to just under 20% if 
unidentified nominees are included. 
71 
The implications of these figures are widespread as they reveal the 
potential voting strength of the institutional investors. Also, if the institutional 
investors do follow fads then they could have severe effects on share prices. 
Their potential influence due to the size of their holdings may also warrant 
managers to take heed of any suggestions or criticisms the institutional 
investors may make. 
Another interesting point to note in Table 3.2 is that on average over 
a third of the shares are owned by the top 5 shareholders. This implies that the 
interests of firms may be controlled by a very small number of people. 
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Table 3.3 breaks these data down even further in order to analyse 
the importance of the holdings of institutional investors in each of the nine 
sectors. It focuses only on the percentage of shares held by the top five 
institutional investors as they are of most interest to this study. 
TABLE 3.3 -A SECTORAL BREAKDOWN OF THE 
PERCENTAGE OF SHARES HELD BY THE TOP 5 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS. 
MAX MIN MEAN S. D 
BEERS 25.7 2.9 13.5 6.6 
CHEM 28.0 3.5 15.0 5.2 
DRAPERY 60.2 2.7 16.3 11.8 
LEISURE 26.6 2.9 11.6 4.8 
FOOD 22.3 2.7 10.9 4.7 
PAPER 29.1 1.4 15.0 6.2 
PROPERTY 27.4 2.5 15.6 7.3 
ELECTRIC 31.0 5.3 15.0 6.0 
ENG 50.8 5.2 18.9 9.4 
TOTAL 60.2 1.4 14.9 7.7 
Table 3.3 shows that on average each of these sectors had more than 
10% of their shares held by the top 5 institutional investors. The lowest 
representation of shares held by institutional investors in any one sector was 
paper, printing and advertising where only 1.4% were held. The highest 
representation was in the drapery sector and was 60.2%. Interestingly this 
sector also had the greatest spread as shown by the standard deviation figures. 
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It was important to breakdown the statistics in this way because the 
figures for the total do not show how diverse the spread is within sectors, and 
thus a more realistic picture is formed by analysing these statistics. Moreover, 
one of the aims in this chapter is to see why there is a wide variation in 
ownership structure. The advantages and disadvantages of different ownership 
structures have been explained above and in Table 3.3 the variation in the 
ownership structure of the sample of firms can be seen. 
3.3 - METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS. 
The firms were combined and ordinary least square regressions 
were run on each of the ownership classifications ie 115, IINS, T5 and T20. 
The results are shown in Table 3.4. 
Before analysing the results they must be validated by applying the 
correct diagnostic tests. The first step was to test whether there is serial 
correlation present in the model. This was done to ensure that, in this cross 
section study, the residual in one company is not related to that of another. If 
this were the case then the assumptions for using OLS would be violated and 
the estimates would be unbiased and inconsistent. This test was applied by 
comparing the F statistic in Table 3.4 with that of the critical value (5%) so a 
null hypothesis of no serial correlation is expected. 
The second step was to test whether the specified linear model had 
the correct functional form. Once again the F test was applied and the results 
were found to be below the critical value. Thus the linear form specified was 
not rejected. The third test was to see whether the residuals are normally 
distributed. This is based on the concept of skewness and excess kurtosis. By 
applying the Chi test the residuals were found to be normally distributed. The 
assumption of a normal distribution is, therefore, not rejected. 
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Finally, it was essential to test whether the residual variance is 
constant ie. homoscedastic. The absence of this leads to a bias in the variances. 
After applying the F test no evidence of heteroscedasticity was found. 
Muticollinearity leads to a loss of confidence in the coefficients of a 
model and subsequently to poor estimates of the elasticities to be calculated. 
Multicollinearity is always present, however, its degree of severity is the 
important issue. There are two ways of detecting multicollinearity. The first is 
to draw up a correlation matrix and the second is to regress the variables onto 
each other. After producing an estimated correlation matrix of the dependent 
variables there was no detection of severe problems of multicollinearity 3 
The application of these tests has shown that the model is 
statistically well specified (ie. there is no evidence of serial correlation or 
heteroscedasticity). The linear functional form is correct and the residuals are 
normally distributed. The model can now be used since it has been established 
that the coefficients and their t-values are unbiased and efficient. 
Table 3.4 shows two columns for each category of shareholders. 
The first column gives the results for all the variables. The second column 
marked `BEST' gives the results after eliminating any insignificant variables 
using the step-wise regression procedure of backward elimination. ` It may be 
questioned whether dropping variables is justified since it has been established 
that the model is well specified and that the estimates are efficient. However, 
data deletion tests were applied to see if the restrictions are valid. In all the 
results reported below they have been found to be valid. The results are thus 
statistically sound. 
Kennedy (1985) suggests that correlation of 0.8 or more should be avoided between independent variables. 
4 see Maddala (1978) p125 
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TABLE 3.4: OLS ESTIMATES OF ALL FIRMS. 
II IINS T5 T20 
BEST BEST BEST BEST 
C 17.60 17.15 24.78 25.26 41.21 43.11 64.69 64.64 
(8.1) (8.6) (8.6) (9.5) (8.9) (10.1) (14.1) (14.4) 
SALES . 0.01 -0.01 -. 007 -. 006 . 008 . 0008 
(-2.1) (-2.4) (-1.0) (-1.1) (0.7) (0.07) 
PTAX . 0005 . 0002 -0.01 -0.01 -. 008 -. 008 
(0.1) (-0.06) (-2.5) (-2.4) (-1.3) (. 1.5) 
PMAR . 006 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.02 
(0.2) (1.1) (1.0) (0.7) (0.4) 
RSHF -0.01 -. 005 -0.01 -. 009 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 
(-1.1) (-0.9) (-1.2) (-1.2) (1.0) (1.2) (1.5) (1.4) 
LIQ 3.11 3.01 2.46 2.41 1.03 3.25 2.90 
(3.4) (3.3) (2.0) (2.0) (0.5) (1.6) (1.5) 
GEAR . 003 . 005 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
(0.6) (0.7) (-1.2) (. 1.3) (-1.8) (-1.7) 
BETA -3.74 -4.45 -8.56 -7.84 -34.51 -34.26 -34.91 -34.73 
(-1.7) (-2.3) (-2.9) (-3.1) (-7.5) ((-7.5)(-7.5) (-7.6) 
S. D -0.03 0.02 0.66 0.65 0.61 0.61 
(-0.7) (0.3) (6.6) (6.8) (6.1) (6.4) 
RET -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 . 007 -0.02 
(-2.7) (. 2.7) (-2.1) (-2.3) (0.2) (-0.9) 
R2 . 09 . 08 . 07 . 06 . 22 . 21 . 22 . 21 
DW 1.8 1.8 2.01 2.01 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 
F 3.0 5.3 2.2 3.3 8.5 15.2 8.4 12.5 
(t statistics in paranthesis) 
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Table 3.4 shows that in the regressions run for 115 the variables on 
the whole have tended to go in the direction predicted ie, a negative 
relationship. The only exceptions were profit before tax, profit margin, 
liquidity and gearing ratios. These variables, however, were not significant. 
In the case of the `best' estimates for 115 the coefficients of the size 
variables ie. sales was negative and significant at the 5% level. The coefficient 
for return to shareholders funds was negative as predicted, however, it was 
insignificant. The liquidity ratio was positive and significant. The instability 
measures beta and annual actual returns were negative and significant. 
The Durbin Watson value gives no indication of any problems of 
autocorrelation and the F statistic in both the columns concerning 115 shows 
that the overall equation is significant. The R2 was particularly low showing 
that these variables account for only 8% of the variation in the top five 
institutional investors. This low figure is not of too much concern because in 
cross section studies it does tend to be low. It does, however, emphasise that 
these variables may attract the institutional investors to the company, but there 
may be other factors which may be of greater importance to the institutional 
investors decisions, e. g. their incentives, duties etc. 
In the case of the top 5 institutional investors and nominees (IIN5) 
very similar results were found to those reported above. This is not too 
surprising because, although these nominees have not been identified they may 
actually be institutional investors and thus have the same criteria for 
investment. The third column in Table 3.4 shows a negative relationship with 
sales, return to shareholders funds, beta and annual actual return. The 
coefficient for profit margin was positive but was not significant. The R2 was 
low once again but the overall equation was significant. Turning to column 
four, the results are similar to those of the best estimates for 115 with no 
exceptions. 
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The results in Table 3.4 are particularly interesting in that they 
highlight the significant differences between 115 and IIN5 and those of T5 and 
T20. The results of the last two groups are very similar, however, they do 
differ significantly from those of the institutional investors. 
In the case of the T5 and T20 results most of the size variables with 
the exception of pre tax profits and the gearing ratio were positively related to 
ownership concentration. From the instability measures the coefficient of beta 
was negative and significant in all cases whereas that for variability was 
positive and significant. The annual actual return figures varied but were 
insignificant in all cases. The R squared's are much higher in all these cases 
compared to those of the previous two cases (115 and IIN5). The overall 
equations are significant. 
After looking at the firms together it is important to analyse them 
sector by sector. Table 3.5 shows the sectoral results for the regression on one 
measure of ownership concentration, namely 115 which is the group of 
shareholders this study is predominantly concerned with. 
The results show that sales are negative, as predicted, for all sectors 
except food and electricals, but in both these cases the coefficients were not 
significant. Pretax profits had a mixture of signs but were insignificant except 
for electricals where the sign was negative. The profit margin was insignificant 
in all sectors and the signs varied. Return to shareholders funds were negative 
and significant for chemicals, property and engineering. The liquidity ratio was 
positive and significant for drapery, leisure and property. The gearing ratio was 
negative and significant for beer and leisure. Annual actual returns were also 
negative and significant for leisure, food and property. 
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TABLE 3.5: OLS REGRESSIONS OF SECTORS. 
BEER CHEM DRAP LEIS FOOD PAPER PROP ELEC ENG 
C 37.71* 0.41 15.30* 25.03*14.29*22.18* 22.57*8.10 42.26* 
(4.1) (0.03) (1.2) (3.8) (2.4) (3.2) (3.2) (14.4) 
SALES -0.02 -0.13* -0.02 -0.07 0.01 -0.01* . 0.04* 0.07 -0.02 
(-0.3) (-1.4) (-0.4) (-0.5) (0.5) (-2.1) (1.2) (1.5) (-0.2) 
PTAX . 0.04 0.09* 0.0008 -. 008 -0.01 . 0007 . 007 -0.04* -. 002 
(-0.7) (1.3) (0.01) (. 0.7) (-0.5) (0.2) (0.2) (-2. S) (. 0.06) 
PMAR . 005 0.2 0.35 -0.03 -0.47 -0.14 -0.01 -0.11 . 0.16 
(0.02) (0.6) (0.5) (-0.3) (-1.0) (-0.5) (-0.4) (-0.6) (-1.1) 
RSHF 0.09 -0.27* -0.04 0.01 0.03 -. 007 -0.11* 0.04 -0.2* 
(0.5) (. 2.0) (-0.2) (0.4) (0.3) (-0.5) (. 2.3) (0.5) (-1.3) 
L_S . 0.68 1.67 8.0* 2.54* -2.27 2.57 3.78* 2.44 3.02 
(-0.4) (-0.3) (2.1) (1.3) (-0.9) (0.6) (1.6) (0.6) (0.5) 
GEAR -0.33* 0.02 0.01 -. 04* -. 003 -. 0003 -. 01 -. 001 0.01 
(-3.8) (0.4) (0.3) (-2.2) (-0.1) (-. 03) (-0.5) (-. 06) (0.2) 
BETA -11.63 22.75* -12.02 -5.14 -0.98 -10.48 -5.68 3.06 -12.1* 
(-1.0) (1.7) (. 0.9) (-1.1) (-0.1) (-1.5) (. 0.8) (0.5) (-1.3) 
S. D. -0.39* . 0005 . 05 -. 17* 0.04 0.06 0.03 -0.02 . 0.15 
(-1.4) (. 002) (0.2) (-1.8) (0.5) (0.3) (0.1) (-0.1) (-0.7) 
RET -0.01 -. 005 0.02 -0.05* -0.06* -. 008 -0.16* -. 0002 -. 09 
(. 0.4) (. 0.1) (0.3) (-2.4) (-1.4) (. 0.1) (-2.2) (-. 009) (. 1.0) 
R2 . 92 . 52 . 40 . 46 . 35 . 31 . 41 . 25 . 28 
DW 1.97 1.34 2.47 1.78 2.50 1.75 2.03 1.45 1.95 
F 8.7 1.3 1.4 1.9 1.4 1.2 1.5 1.1 1.5 
(t statistics in paranthesis) 
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On the whole these results were as predicted. However, if the 
sectors are taken individually the chemicals, drapery, property and electricals 
had results contrary to those predicted as they tended to have positive 
coefficients both for the size and instability measures. The values of R2 are 
satisfactory for a cross section study. The Durbin Watson statistic showed no 
problems of autocorrelation. Tests for multicollinearity were applied by 
drawing up a correlation matrix but found no evidence of multicollinearity. The 
low F statistic can be explained by the relatively small sample size in each 
sector. 
These results show a general model including all the variables on the 
basis of previous studies. The model was, once again, statistically well 
specified. There was no evidence of serial correlation or heteroscedasticity, the 
residuals were normally distributed and the functional form was correct. The 
coefficients are thus efficient and unbiased. 
In order to eliminate the insignificant variables the method of 
backward elimination by the step-wise regression was applied as in the 
previous example. The insignificant variables were eliminated one at a time and 
their effects on the remaining variables were analysed by checking the F 
statistic, standard error etc. The best statistical model is then found and this is 
presented in Table 3.6. 
In comparison to the previous table the constant term in Table 3.6 
has increased in all cases, which is to be expected when variables are dropped 
because it incorporates all the variables that are not in the regression but do 
affect the independent variable in some way. The t statistics of the remaining 
variables have increased in all cases showing an improvement in the 
significance of the coefficients. 
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TABLE 3.6: BEST OLS ESTIMATES OF SECTORS. 
BEER CHEM DRAP LEIS FOOD PAPER PROP ELEC ENG 
C 41.02* -1.56 13.30* 22.66 15.83* 23.53* 16.90* 12.70* 44.90* 
(9.9) (. 0.1) (1.6) (4.9) (10.3) (4.1) (8.1) (9.4) (5.6) 
SALES -0.09* -0.01* -0.03* 0.07* 
(-2.3) (-2.6) (-1.8) (1.9) 
PTAX -0.06* 0.07* -0.03* 
(. 1.6) (2.0) (-3.2) 
PMAR 0.32 -0.33* -0.18 -0.13* 
(1.06) (-1.7) (-1.0) (-1.3) 
RSHF -0.21* -. 008* -0.10* . 0.21* 
(-2.7) (-1.7) (-2.4) (-1.6) 
Lý 8.59* 2.71* -2.85* 3.40 2.61* 
(2.9) (1.5) (-1.9) (1.0) (1.5) 
GEAR -0.32* -0.04* 
(-6.1) (-2.4) 
BETA -9.26* 24.19* . 9.05 -6.01* -9.82* -10.26 
(-1.6) (2.7) (-1.1 (-1.7) (-2.2) (-1.3) 
S. D. -0.57* -0.11* -0.19 
(4.8) (. 1.8) (. 1.0) 
RET -0.04* -0.07* -0.14* -. 19 
(. 2.2) (. 1.9) (-2.1) (-1.1) 
R2 . 91 . 47 . 37 . 41 . 34 . 30 . 37 . 22 . 27 
DW 1.7 1.6 2.4 2.0 2.5 1.7 2.1 1.4 1.9 
F 28.06 3.60 4.99 3.40 5.04 2.40 3.75 5.20 3.03 
(t statistics in paranthesis) 
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In analysing the sectors it can be seen that sales are negative and 
significant in all sectors except electricals. Pretax profits were negative and 
significant in all sectors except chemicals. The profit margin was negative and 
significant in all sectors except drapery. Return to shareholders funds were 
negative and significant in all sectors. The liquidity ratio was positive and 
significant for all sectors except food. The gearing ratio was negative and 
significant. Beta was negative and significant for all sectors except chemicals. 
S. D. was negative and significant as were annual actual returns. The F 
statistics show that the equations overall were significant. The results, on the 
whole, are as predicted thus corroborating our theory outlined above. 
The only two sectors which did not behave as predicted are 
chemicals and electricals. In the chemical sector both the size measure, pretax 
profits - and the instability measure, beta - are positively related to ownership 
concentration. For electricals sales are positively related to ownership 
concentration. 
The only result of concern is that for the sector beers, wines and 
spirits. In this sector the R2 is extremely high and the F statistic shows that the 
overall equation is significant. There may be problems of multicollinearity. 
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3.4 - SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter set out to find why there is a greater degree of 
institutional investor involvement in some firms than in others. It attempted to 
establish some of the broad forces that influence ownership structure. The 
empirical work was based on studies of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Leech 
and Leahy (1989). Using a random sample of 278 UK firms from nine non- 
financial sectors for the year 1989, it looked at some leading characteristics of 
these firms, namely those variables measuring the firm size and the instability 
of the fine. 
The firm size variables used in the study were sales, the profit 
margin, pre-tax profits and return to shareholders funds. The risk variables 
were the liquidity ratio, gearing ratio, beta, standard deviation of returns to the 
index and the annual actual return. A negative relationship between firm size 
and the concentration of ownership was predicted. The reasoning behind this is 
that the larger the firm the more difficult and expensive it is for any one 
investor to dominate decision taking. There is also the transactions motive 
whereby it is easier for any investor to sell the shares of a larger company. 
There is also the opportunity to shirk in a large concern where you assume that 
other shareholders will undertake their ownership duties more responsibly. 
A negative relationship between the risk variables and the 
concentration of ownership was also predicted. This is because the more 
unstable an environment as depicted by unstable prices, technology etc., the 
more discretion managers have to make decisions. Institutional investors 
would prefer not to hold too great a share of the firm because they want to 
diversify any risk attached to the firm. 
The results show that there is an overall negative relationship 
between firm size and the concentration of ownership. This is as predicted and 
is consistent with the studies of both Demsetz and Lehn and Leech and Leahy. 
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An overall negative relationship between risk and ownership 
concentration was found, however, the results were not all significant. The 
results are inconclusive, although, the transactions motive for investing in 
larger firms seems more plausible than the risk averse motive. This study has 
not tested whether smaller companies are riskier than larger companies. 
However, it is likely that they do have higher transactions costs attached to 
them. 
Institutional investors may not wish to get involved with the close 
running of the firm for two main reasons; firstly because they have their own 
business to run e. g. providing insurance and secondly, because each company 
they invest in is only a small proportion of their overall portfolio and may not 
warrant the time and expense associated with monitoring performance. 
This chapter has attempted to explain why institutional investors 
may want to hold specific types of shares. The following chapter considers 
their effects on the stock market. 
84 
CHAPTER 4- THE EFFECT OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 
ON THE STOCK EXCHANGE. 
The previous chapter studied the structure of corporate ownership 
with particular reference to institutional investors. This leads to another aspect 
of interest which is their increasing presence in the stock market, particularly in 
the market for ordinary shares. This chapter is a move towards analysing their 
effects on share prices. The following chapter will empirically analyse some of 
the propositions set out here. 
The last few centuries have seen the growth in the size of firms 
together with a growth in their financial requirements. The rise of these firms 
has been accompanied by the evolution of capital markets whose function it is 
to facilitate the transfer of funds between lenders and borrowers. The stock 
market is a segment of the capital market relating to the financing needs of 
firms. It directly and indirectly influences the allocation of scarce capital 
resources. Direct influence comes from the primary market where firms are 
attempting to raise new finance. The availability of finance depends on the 
stock market's assessment of the specific firm and its prospects. 
Indirect influence on resource allocation is exercised by the stock 
market in the form of share prices and investment comment, e. g. poorly 
performing firms will be showing low investment returns and may be prone to 
takeover bids. The takeover of a badly run company should result in an 
improved economic performance on the resources employed in the long run. 
The first section in this chapter assesses the efficiency of capital 
markets in order to determine whether security prices provide accurate signals 
for resource allocation. An efficient capital market is defined as one where 
prices fully and instantaneously reflect all available information. An efficient 
stock market implies that the complete body of publicly available knowledge 
regarding a firm's prospects is interpreted `correctly' in the share price. It also 
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implies that any new data are incorporated instantaneously into the price. This 
chapter seeks to establish the role institutional investors play in this issue. 
The second section deals with the informational aspects. If the stock 
market is not perfectly efficient then there is scope for profit due to significant 
differences in the quality of the information between investors. This is 
particularly so where there is a high degree of institutional presence because 
they have the ability to obtain superior information. This gives them the 
potential to significantly affect share prices. 
The third section of this chapter looks at the issue of volatility and 
whether the market is myopic. Furthermore, it questions whether there is any 
link between this alleged myopia and increased institutional investor ownership 
of equity. However, first the broad area of efficiency is discussed in the light 
of the literature to date. 
4.1 - THE EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS 
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) holds that market prices 
fully and instantaneously reflect all available information. This is important 
because if security prices can be relied upon to reflect the economic signals 
which the market receives, then they can also be looked in turn to provide 
useful signals to both suppliers and users of capital. The former for the 
purposes of constructing their investment portfolios and the latter for 
establishing criteria for efficient disposition of the funds at their disposal. Lack 
of confidence in the pricing efficiency of the market tends to focus the attention 
of both investors and raisers of capital on potentially wasteful techniques of 
exploiting perceived inefficiencies, and away from a more positive recognition 
of the messages contained in the market prices. 
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The term `efficiency' refers to how successful the market is in 
establishing security prices that reflect the `worth' of the securities. Success is 
defined in terms of whether the market incorporates all new information in its 
security prices in a rapid and unbiased manner. It refers to two aspects of price 
adjustment to new information, the speed and quality of the adjustment. The 
main effect of efficiency is that it should not be possible for any investor to 
systematically outperform the market. If the market were deficient in terms of 
the speed and quality of its reaction, the informed and alert observer would 
have little difficulty in profiting from the situation. The EMH implies that 
prices are `correct' and provide accurate signals for resource allocation. The 
essence of a correct price is not that it predicts the future, but that it fully 
captures the uncertainties of the future. 
The discussion of market efficiency dates from 1966 when it was 
defined as the process of finding mispriced securities. It was a practical 
concept rather than a fundamental economic one. In 1970 Fama introduced a 
more formal definition. He states that a securities market is efficient if security 
prices fully reflect the information available. This definition was criticised 
because the terms `fully reflect' and `information available' were vague and 
non-operational. Consequently, in 1976, Fama provided an alternative 
definition: the market was efficient if the `market' used the true conditional 
probability density function of of future prices in the determination of current 
security prices. This was the definition adopted by economists and 
econometricians. Implicit in this definition was the assumption that investors 
form expectation rationally. 
The problem with this definition lay in the use of the term `market'. 
Unless it was assumed that all individuals have homogeneous beliefs and 
expectations it is not possible to define what is meant by `market'. In an 
attempt to overcome these difficulties Beaver (1981) developed the definition 
as markets being efficient with respect to the information system: "The market 
is efficient with respect to some specified information system, if and only if, 
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security prices act as if everyone observes the information system. " 
This definition has several advantages: 
1. It permits a definition of market efficiency in a world of individuals who are 
heterogeneous with respect to beliefs and information. 
2. It permits endowments and preferences to play a natural role in influencing 
prices. 
3. It permits individuals to perceive the market to be inefficient with respect to 
some information even if it is not. 
4. It gives the term fully reflect a well defined meaning. 
5. It focuses upon prices as opposed to beliefs and actions. 
6. It relates directly to prior allegations of market inefficiency and to the set of 
empirical research that has been directed at those allegations. 
7. It permits the concept to be finely partitioned with respect to information as 
may be desired and it avoids severe definitions of market efficiency. 
Despite these advantages the problem with Beavers' definition is that 
it says nothing about the rationality of investors. It omits to say how they use 
this information and whether or not they act upon it. Consequently, Fama's 
definition has been used consistently because it is easier to test. 
Three different levels of efficiency are identified by Fama (1972). 
Each level relates to a specific set of information which is increasingly more 
comprehensive than the previous one. The first of these levels is `weak' form 
efficiency. This is where share prices fully reflect the information implied by all 
prior price movements. They are independent of previous movement. This 
implies the absence of any price patterns with prophetic significance and so 
investors are unable to profit from studying charts of past prices. 
The second form is `semi-strong' efficiency where share prices 
respond instantaneously and without bias to newly published information. This 
renders it futile for investors to search for bargain opportunities by analysing 
published data. 
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Finally, there is `strong' form efficiency where share prices reflect 
not only published information, but all relevant information including data not 
yet publicly available. In this case, not even an* insider can profit from his 
privileged position. 
There have been many tests carried out on all three levels of 
efficiency (see Dobbins and Witt (1980); Keane (1980)). It is important to test 
efficiency because if markets are efficient in the strong sense then the activities 
of institutional investors cannot make a difference in the capital market. 
Fama looks specifically at whether it pays the average investor to 
expend resources searching out little-known information. He also looks at 
whether these activities are profitable for the various groups of market 
professionals and concludes that for the purposes of most investors the EMH 
seems a good approximation to reality. 
There is evidence leading to rejection of the EMH. However, it is 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to test the EMH directly. Most of the 
empirical studies are not testing the EMH but some implications or conditions 
for the EMH to hold true. The implications of the EMH are as follows: 
1. Returns should be uncorrelated. 
2. Expected excess returns should be zero i. e. no abnormal profits made. 
3. Existence of no superior trading strategies. 
4. Instantaneous and unbiased response to new information. This implies there 
are no benefits in acquiring it. 
Statements such as "markets are efficient" or "markets are 
inefficient" are ambiguous and incomplete. They should specify whether they 
are referring to strong, semi-strong or weak form efficiency. Efficiency cannot 
be rejected but its degree can be questioned. The tentative conclusion here, 
based on the evidence of past studies, is that the strong form of the EMH 
89 
cannot hold and because of this there is scope for some investors, in particular 
institutional investors, to have access to informational advantages not available 
to smaller investors. 
The work of Grossman is seen as a development of the EMH. It 
may be that the presence of transaction costs implies that prices do not fully 
reflect all information. Thus, firms which expend on research should perform 
better than those that do not. This does not imply that they are outperforming 
the market, they are making normal returns but the transaction costs are being 
accounted for. 
Both Fama and Beaver did not take into account transaction costs, 
they rejected the possibility of abnormal returns under any circumstances. In 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1976) individuals are not endowed with the same 
information. In this framework, equilibrium in security prices transmits some 
information but not all. Prices no longer fully reflect all the information 
available, indeed, the concept `fully reflect' plays no role for Grossman and 
Stiglitz. The next section discusses these informational differences and their 
effects in more detail. 
4.2 - INFORMATION 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1976) reassess the meaning and validity of 
the EMH. They attempt to answer questions regarding how the price system 
leads the economy to respond to a new situation, how it conveys information 
from informed individuals to uninformed individuals and how it aggregates the 
different information of different individuals. Grossman and Stiglitz' analysis 
can be applied to institutional investors because they have access to 
informational advantages through their special relations with brokers and by 
having their own professional analysts. Small investors, on the other hand, 
may have to rely on cheaper alternatives such as the Financial Press. 
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This can be illustrated using an example taken from Grossman and 
Stiglitz (1976). Assume there are two assets, one safe and one risky. The 
return on the risky asset r depends on a random variable n which can be 
observed at a cost and an unobservable variable E. This is not a derivation of 
their model, only an illustration of their results. 
r=n+E where n and E are independent, normally distributed 
random variables. 
Knowing n reduces but does not eliminate the risk associated with 
the asset. The per capita demand, X1, for the asset by those informed of n 
depends on the price of the asset and the value of m 
X1 = Xl(p, n) Assuming dXl/dn > 0, dXl/dp <0 
Equilibrium each period requires that demand equals supply: 
ßX1(p, n) + (1-ß)Xu(p) = Xs Where: 
Xu = per capita demand of the uninformed 
Xs = per capita supply 
ß= fraction of informed individuals. 
Uninformed individuals observe only price, but from the price they 
may be able to infer n. For example, if the stock of resources were fixed, the 
uninformed individual can infer that a high p is associated with a high n, since 
an increase in n increases informed demand and thus the price. As there are no 
other stochastic elements in this model, . there will be precisely one n 
corresponding to any p. Therefore, the conditional distribution of r given p is 
the same as the conditional distribution of r given n. Thus the price system 
conveys all the information from the informed individuals to the uninformed. 
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Further randomness is now introduced e. g. in the stock of the risky 
asset or in the demand functions of the informed or uninformed individuals. 
The price may be high because n is high or because the supply of the risky 
asset is low or because informed individuals' demand functions have shifted 
upwards. Therefore, there is a distribution of possible values of n 
corresponding to any p. The price system conveys some information, but does 
not transmit all the information from the informed to the uninformed. 
There are no costs of obtaining information and so the marginal 
individual who chooses to become informed must be indifferent to being 
informed or uninformed. The increment in expected utility from becoming 
informed is exactly offset by the cost of the information. In making this 
calculation, individuals assume that a change in their information would have 
no effect on prices. 
When no one is informed, the price system conveys no information 
so the value of information about n is likely to be high. When almost everyone 
is informed, the price system is very informative, so the value of knowing n 
precisely is low. This implies that the EMH is a paradox because it argues that 
the prices on capital markets reflect all the relevant information instantaneously. 
The paradox is resolved by arguing that there are constantly new shocks to the 
economy which affect market returns. The capital market must continually 
adjust to these shocks. 
In the structure developed by Grossman and Stiglitz the market 
never fully adjusts and prices never fully reflect all the information possessed 
by the informed individuals. Capital markets are not efficient, but the 
difference is just enough to provide the revenue required to compensate the 
informed for purchasing the information. The equilibrium fraction of informed 
traders is determined jointly with the informativeness of the price system in 
such a way as to generate a competitive return to arbitrage. 
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Perfect arbitrage implies that not all traders need to be informed. 
This is because the informed traders make prices reflect true values so the 
uninformed can simply take advantage of this. This is not true of the Grossman 
and Stiglitz analysis, for it is only because prices do not accurately represent 
the true worth of the securities, that the informed are able to earn a return to 
compensate them for the costs associated with the acquisition of the 
information. 
Grossman and Stiglitz's (1980) analysis can be applied to 
institutional investors: 
In their model, prices reflect the information of informed individuals 
but only partially. Consequently, it is beneficial to expend resources in order to 
obtain information. The level of information in the price system is dependent 
on the number of individuals who are informed and these individuals are an 
endogeneous variable of the model. 
The model consists of two assets, a safe asset yielding a return R 
and a risky asset with a return U which varies randomly from period to period 
where: 
U=0+a 
0 and 8 are random variables where 0 is observable at cost C and 8 is 
unobservable. 
There are two types of investors, firstly those who observe 0. 
These are the informed traders such as institutional investors. This is because 
they are better informed due to their own professional analysts, close relations 
with brokers, and finally, they may be close to their portfolio firms and thus 
have the potential to gain access to inside information. 
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The second type of investor are those who observe only price such 
as small, private investors. These are the uninformed traders who find it costly 
to gain information. It is not worth their while to buy costly information if they 
are only investing small sums of money. 
The informed institutional investors' demands depend on 0 and the 
price of the risky asset R. The uninformed individuals' demands depend only 
on P. However, they have rational expectations. They learn the relationship 
between the distribution of return and price and use this in deriving their 
demand for the risky assets. 
If x denotes the supply of the risky asset and in equilibrium a given 
percentage, Pp, are informed institutional investors. Then, a price function, 
PAC (O, x), is formed such that demand equals supply. 
It has been assumed that informed individuals do not observe x. 
They are prevented from learning 0 via observations of PAC (0, x) because 
they cannot distinguish variations in price due to changes in aggregate supply. 
Clearly, PAC (0, x), reveals some of the institutional investors to the 
individuals. 
The expected utility of the institutional investors and individuals can 
be calculated. If the former is greater than the latter, inclusive of informational 
costs, some individuals switch to becoming institutional investors. They can 
do this by placing their money into unit trusts, investment trusts etc. An overall 
equilibrium requires the two to have the same expected utility. As more 
individuals become institutional investors, the expected utility of institutional 
investors falls relative to individuals. This is because the price system becomes 
more informative because variations in prices have a greater effect on aggregate 
demand and thus on p when more traders observe 0. As the price system 
becomes more informed there is a reduction in the informational differences of 
the traders. Even if the above effect did not occur, the increase in the ratio of 
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informed to uninformed means that the relative gains of the informed in trading 
with the uninformed will be smaller on a per capita basis. 
In summary, the greater the number of individuals who are informed 
the more informative the price system. Furthermore, there is a lower ratio of 
expected utility from the informed to the uninformed. 
Studies have been undertaken regarding investors use of information 
in practice. Boys and Rutherford (1984) assess the extent to which institutional 
investors use current cost accounting information in arriving at investment 
decisions. After interviewing a sample of institutional investors they found that 
institutional investors varied widely to the extent in which they relied on 
information derived from `secondary' sources and, in particular, on both 
brokers' circulars and personal contact with brokers. Some relied heavily on 
these sources arguing that duplicating the efforts of brokers would not yield a 
sufficiently high additional return from the insights achieved to cover the costs 
involved. They engaged in little, if any, fundamental analysis, particularly in 
arriving at `routine' buy-hold-sell decisions. In some cases where accounts 
were examined analysts spent as little as one hour on them. Institutional 
investors tended to rely on brokers' analysts, not only for the provision of 
information regarding companies, but also for the selection of information 
required to make any decisions. 
Other institutional investors preferred to conduct a substantial 
amount of fundamental analysis for themselves, either because they had special 
requirements which were not catered for by brokers, or they felt that the data 
provided by brokers were inadequate. Analysts working for such institutional 
investors might spend several days on fundamental analysis of a single 
company. 
Irrespective of whether an institutional investor performed 
fundamental analysis, it would maintain close contact with brokers since they 
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were a useful source of guidance for the timing of the institutional investor's 
acquisition or disposal of shares. Analysts of institutional investors are 
particularly interested in establishing trends and in being able to compare 
companies both within the same sector and in different sectors. Most analysts 
place great emphasis on the profit and loss account and any detailed 
information on sales and profits. Cash flow is also regarded as being of vital 
importance and much weight is attached to any information about the future 
prospects of the company provided in the report. The main purpose of the 
analytical process for most analysts is to try to forecast future earnings on a 
historical cost basis and thereby determine whether a share is cheap or dear and 
whether to buy, hold or sell. 
Boys and Rutherford conclude that company reports and accounts 
are an important source of information for the analysts of institutional 
investors, along with brokers' circulars, contacts with company managers and 
financial briefing services such as Datastream. 
Institutional investors have been widely believed to move together in 
a `herd' due to their similarities in the sources of their information (Shiller 
(1981)). Their increased presence in the stock market is also said to lead to 
highly volatile markets. The next section looks at some of these consequences 
and their economic significance. 
4.3 - VOLATILITY AND FADS 
The presence of institutional investors in the stock market may 
influence share prices in several undesirable ways. For example, the increasing 
equity market share buy-and-hold policies of insurance companies and pension 
funds may eventually lead to a volatile stock market in which few shares are 
available for trading. Persistent purchasing of a firm's shares by institutional 
shareholders may have a permanent bullish influence on share prices and may 
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serve to deprive smaller companies or new ventures of a source of finance. 
Institutional investors may be responsible for creating a two tier market, 
concentrating their activity in a few large companies and thus raising the price 
of shares in these companies. Finally, disposals and acquisitions of large 
blocks of shares may cause major swings in share prices (Dobbins and Witt 
(1983)). Some of these practices will be reflected in volatility in the stock 
market. 
Recently, there have been a number of studies using measures of 
variance or `volatility' of speculative asset prices to provide evidence against 
simple models of market efficiency. One US study by LeRoy and Porter 
(1981) investigated the implications for asset price dispersion of conventional 
security valuation models. They concluded that in their sample of US firms, 
stock prices appear to be more volatile than is consistent with the EMH. 
Shiller (1981) also finds that stock price volatility is too high to be 
explained by the EMH. He looked at measures of stock price volatility over the 
past century in the US and found that they appear to be far too high, five to 
thirteen times too high, to be attributed to new information about future real 
dividends. The severity of these results renders it impossible to attribute the 
failure of such things as data errors, price index problems etc. 
Shiller consequently proposed an alternative to the EMH based on 
`fads'. This is appealing given the observed tendency of people to follow fads 
in other aspects of their lives and is based on the behaviour of small investors. 
The model does not, however, imply that those who are not vulnerable to fads 
will necessarily make a quick profit. In his 1984 paper he claims that mass 
psychology is the dominant cause of movements in the price of the aggregate 
stock market. Stock prices are vulnerable to purely social movement as there is 
no accepted theory by which to understand the worth of stocks and no clearly 
predictable consequences to change ones' investments. Ordinary investors 
have no model, or at best a very incomplete model of the behaviour of prices, 
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dividends and earnings of speculative assets so they are faced with uncertainty. 
They cannot judge the competence of investment counsellors and many of them 
do not understand data analysis or risk correction which is necessary 
knowledge for evaluating the data. 
Since these investors lack any clear sense of objective evidence 
regarding the prices of speculative assets, their opinions may be formed 
through social pressure. They may go along with the majority despite rationally 
believing something else. This is highlighted as a part of human instinctive 
behaviour by Asch (1952) who experimented with individuals alone and in 
groups and had them compare the lengths of line segments. The lengths were 
sufficiently different and so, when responding individually, few wrong 
answers were given. However, when placed in a group where all the other 
members were coached to give the same wrong answers, individual subjects 
also gave wrong answers even though they were aware of the correct answers. 
They were afraid to contradict the group. 
The same can be applied to institutional investors who may be afraid 
of going against the grain. Their aim may be not to get left behind, rather than 
to outperform the market. If a large number of institutional investors are 
investing in a specific asset the remaining investors may feel pressured into 
investing in that asset in case the others are aware of something that they are 
not. 
Shiller and LeRoy and Porter have empirical evidence that stock 
prices and long interest rates are more volatile than can be justified by the 
standard asset-pricing models. However, Flavin. (1983) shows that in small 
samples, the `volatility' or `variance bound' tests tend to be biased, often 
severely, toward rejection of the EMH. Therefore, the apparent violation of 
market efficiency may be reflecting the sampling properties of the volatility 
measures, rather than a failure of the EMH itself. Flavin also reports some 
unbiased estimates of the bounds on holding period yields and long interest 
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rates. Much of the evidence of excess volatility disappears when the tests are 
corrected for small sample bias. 
Another allegation directed at institutional investors has been that 
they react to short term pressure on investment performance. They tend to be 
unwilling to countenance long term investment or a sufficient expenditure on 
research and development (Chancellor of the Exchequer (1986)). This myopic 
view of financial markets is backed by the Wilson Committee who reported 
that, `Many financiers may ... have shorter time horizons' and `Many 
financiers look for a return in the form of higher profits much sooner than 
industry itself would be prepared to contemplate'. Walker (1985), an Executive 
Director of the Bank of England, also claimed that investors suffer from 
`unduly myopic views' and force firm managers to concentrate on short-term 
performance instead of developing long-term strategies. 
There is much evidence supporting the view that markets are 
myopic. Carsberg and Day (1984) concluded that `Investment analysts appear 
to focus mainly on the prediction of historical cost profits for one or two years 
ahead'. This was supported by Boys and Rutherford (1984) and Arrow (1982) 
suggests that the stock market might attach too much weight to current 
dividends relative to future dividends. Nickell and Wadhwani (1987) argue that 
this view can be regarded as a special case of Shiller's (1984) `fads' model. 
Their results offer considerable support for the view that the market is myopic. 
Turning to the issue of volatile share prices, several studies (Shiller 
(1981), LeRoy and Porter (1981)), have suggested that share prices are too 
volatile relative to the actual future path of dividends and earnings. However, 
in attempting to decide whether or not the market is myopic these tests are 
merely suggestive because the excess volatility can be attributed to a variety of 
different sources e. g., the real discount rate or `fads' might be important 
(Shiller (1982,1984)). 
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Keynes (1936), long ago noted the `herd' instinct of large, 
professional investors. The performance of a pension fund manager is often 
assessed by comparing it with that of other fund managers. A pension fund 
manager who claims to be `rational' while the rest of the market was 
`irrational', but consequently exhibited inferior performance in the short-run, is 
likely to be sacked long before his investment strategy pays off. 
In the UK the increasing institutional ownership of equity has been 
associated with the short term view taken by the stock market. Institutional 
investors regularly `churn' their portfolios because fund managers have their 
performance monitored on a quarterly basis. Unit and investment trusts are 
covered by the Financial Press. 
This does not imply that individual shareholders will be any less 
myopic than institutional investors, for if myopic behaviour stems from certain 
psychological traits, it would be common to all individuals. 
Many individual investors may have a preference for dividends. they 
may believe that shares not paying dividends but yielding capital gains are only 
worth holding at prices lower than those of similar shares paying dividends. 
Some institutional investors are not allowed to hold shares which do not have 
established dividend records. Other trusts are only allowed to spend that part of 
the return from shareholdings which comes in the form of dividends. 
Consequently, the influence of dividends on the share price may be higher than 
that of capital gains. This excess sensitivity to current dividends may arise 
from capital market imperfections which induce shareholders to sell in `bad 
times' and this is likely to effect individuals more than institutional investors. 
Another explanation for this type of myopic behaviour is that it is the result of 
the rule of thumb approach adopted by some institutional investors in order to 
simplify computations. This can also apply to individual investors. 
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The whole concept of irrational behaviour is highlighted by the 
following studies. Shiller's (1987) survey evidence reveals that institutional 
investors were reacting against each other during the stock market crash, rather 
than to hard economic news. According to De Bondt and Thaler (1990) 
overreaction in predictions is the cause of irrational behaviour in markets. 
Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1990) carry out their analysis of how feedback 
traders affect asset returns with the assumption that investors do not learn from 
past experience. 
4.4 - SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has looked at the influence institutional investors have 
on the direction of scarce capital resources. Institutional investors are a distinct 
type of intermediary with a potentially powerful role. They differ from other 
types of investor due to their potential to gain access to special information. 
The chapter has looked at the EMH which assesses how efficiently 
information is incorporated into share prices in terms of its speed and quality. 
Most of the evidence in this chapter is anecdotal and consequently there is no 
firm proof that markets are efficient. There is much evidence, however, from 
past studies that markets tend to be efficient in the weak and semi-strong sense. 
This would imply that there is scope for excess profit where information 
differs between investors and so it would pay the investor to be informed. 
This suggests that the increasing presence of institutional investors 
results in the market being dominated by informed investors. This is because 
institutional investors are assumed to have informational advantages over 
private investors due to favourable relationships with brokers, their own 
analysts and access to inside information due to close links with firms. It might 
be assumed that this would lead to a more rapid and realistic adjustment of 
company prices implying that institutional investors are a positive influence on 
the market. 
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It has been alleged, in previous studies, that due to similarities in the 
information, they obtain, institutional investors cause major swings in share 
prices and behave in a herd-like fashion in the capital markets. This chapter 
provides no conclusive evidence to confirm these studies but the extent to 
which institutional investors effect the general market price level will be tested 
empirically in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5- THE EFFECTS OF INSTITUTIONAL 
INVESTORS' TRADING ACTIVITIES. 
INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter analysed the effect of institutional investors on 
the stock exchange, particularly in terms of the effect of volatility due to their 
allegedly `herd-like' behaviour. It is often suggested that the increase in 
institutional ownership and trading of securities may be expected to cause an 
increased volatility in the prices of (and returns to) shares. 
This chapter tests empirically the effects the trading activities of 
institutional investors have on the general level of share prices. In the UK 
research has been done in this area notably by Briston and Dobbins (1978); 
Dobbins and Witt (1980,1981 and 1983) and Lee and Ward (1980). Dobbins 
and Witt, among other things, look at whether institutional investors cause 
major swings in share prices, thus dominating stock markets. They also 
attempt to identify a market leader; (such a discovery would refute the EMH in 
the strong form). They conclude that institutional investors do influence the 
general level of share prices in the UK stock market but no single financial 
sector was identified as a price leader. 
Many claims have been made about institutional investors. For 
example, it is said that they dominate financial markets as their buying and 
selling activities cause major swings in share prices (Dobbins and Witt 
(1983)). They are also said to move together in a `herd' (see chapter 4), and it 
is believed that brokers tend to favour their institutional clients above smaller 
private clients, because of the immense amount of business they do. Another 
conjecture made is that share prices are sensitive to very high levels of portfolio 
activity. These notions imply that the capital market operates with some degree 
of inefficiency. The validity of this will be tested in the chapter. 
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A high correlation between institutional equity activities and market 
price movements may be a result of institutional investors either making or 
following the market. In other words statistical results give no indication as to 
the direction of causation between the activities of institutional investors and 
and the level of share prices. Friend, Blume and Crockett (1970) examine the 
relationship between the portfolio transactions of mutual funds and stock prices 
and conclude that although the available evidence cannot be used definitively to 
decide whether mutual funds predict or affect stock prices, the market impact 
hypothesis (ie, that the funds affect stock prices) seems more plausible than the 
predictive hypothesis (ie that funds predict stock prices). The market impact 
hypothesis was therefore adopted in this study. The same was adopted by 
Dobbins and Witt. 
This study uses a model similar to that of Dobbins and Witt (1983), 
but whereas they looked at the years 1966 - 1976, this study will analyse 
activity for the years 1970 - 1987. This not only enables an update of their 
work, but will give a clearer picture of the development of the trading activity 
of institutional investors as they have extended their domination of the stock 
markets. During this latter period, there have been other changes in the 
economy which may be of significance in their effects on the activities of the 
institutional investors - for example, the Conservatives coming into power in 
1979. 
The major aims of this chapter are firstly, to identify the impact of 
institutional investors' trading activities on the general level of share prices; 
secondly, to identify any market leaders; and thirdly, to examine whether there 
is any evidence that institutional investors do move together. 
The chapter is set out as follows. The first section is a discussion of 
the theoretical model and sets out the hypothesis to be tested. The second 
section analyses the data, highlighting any problems or limitations and offering 
solutions for these problems. The third section focuses on the estimation and 
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interpretation of the results leading to a fourth section which discusses the 
empirical problems and applies empirical tests. 
The fifth section re-estimates the simple relationships in the light of a 
more advanced econometric technique of cointegration. This seeks to establish 
the long term relationship between the institutional investors themselves. 
Finally, the conclusion draws together the main findings of this chapter and 
discusses their implications. 
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5.1 - THEORETICAL DISCUSSION OF THE MATHEMATICAL 
MODEL. 
The model we are testing is based on that of Dobbins and Witt. The 
period considered is 1970 - 1987 which is 72 quarters. Quarterly data for the 
UK were used to estimate the following model: 
It =a+ Bpt + Jest + Ut 
t=1,2, ...... 72 (1-1970(1), ...... 72-1987(4)), 
Where 
I is the Financial Times All-Share Index. 
P is Equity Purchases by Institutional Investors. 
S is Equity Sales by Institutional Investors. 
u is a random error term. 
a, ß, ýC are parameters to be estimated. 
If institutional investors dominate the stock market this implies a 
tendency for excess demand (purchasing pressure) to push prices upwards and 
excess supply (selling activity) to depress prices. Therefore, the coefficient of 
purchases (ß) is expected to be positive and that of sales (ju) to be negative. 
Furthermore, if the model performs well for one group of 
institutional investor, e. g. pension funds, then they are identified as market 
leaders. 
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In this model it is expected that pension funds and insurance 
companies are market leaders because they are the largest investors and would 
thus have the most effect on the level of share prices. Unit trusts and 
investment trusts are not expected to behave as strongly, because they are much 
smaller in size and are thus less significant than the other two groups. They are 
therefore not predicted to have strong or serious effects on the level of share 
prices, they are, however, expected to move in the same direction as the 
others. 
5.2 - DATA ANALYSIS 
Data were collected for the years 1970 to 1987 from CSO Financial 
Statistics for those years. Quarterly data were collected for the purchases and 
sales of unit trusts, investment trusts, insurance companies and pension funds 
and the Index of share prices. 
Unit trust, investment trust and pension fund data for both 
purchases and sales of UK company securities - ordinary and deferred, were 
given in a quarterly form in CSO Financial Statistics. Insurance companies 
include both long term and general funds. The Index used was the Financial 
Times Actuaries Share Indices : 10 April 1962 = 100 which was also from 
CSO Financial Statistics and the column of particular interest was the Ordinary 
Share Price Index. The data here, however, were given in a monthly form so 
to enable them to correspond to the rest of the data collected they were then 
transformed into quarters by aggregating three monthly observations. 
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5.21 - PROBLEMS WITH THE DATA 
(i) MISSING OBSERVATIONS. 
There were missing observations for six quarters for both pension 
fund purchases and sales, namely 1977 Quarter 4 to 1979 Quarter 1. 
There are many ways of dealing with this problem`. The method 
adopted here to generate the missing values was to regress pension fund 
purchases (PFP) on the Index from 1970Q1 to 1977Q3. This method was 
preferred because it enables us to have a different value for each observation. 
By doing this the following values were generated: 
MISSING OBSERVATIONS (£M) 
YEAR QUARTER PFP PFS 
1977 4 169.72 76.25 
1978 1 130.57 45.21 
2 156.42 65.71 
3 220.41 116.67 
4 203.41 102.97 
1979 1 244.24 135.34 
I see Maddala (1978) 
108 
5.3 ESTIMATION AND INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS. 
The model was estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS), 
firstly, for the four groups of institutional investor individually and then 
combined. 
After running the regressions the purchase figures were found 
positive and significant as predicted for all groups except unit trusts. This 
implies that for all the groups, with the exception of unit trusts, the more 
shares they purchased, the higher they raise the price of the shares. The sales 
figures, on the other hand, were not as predicted except for pension funds and 
insurance companies. However, even for these two groups the results were not 
significant. Unit and investment trusts figures were actually positive for sales, 
which strangely implies that as they sell more shares they raise the price of 
them. This highlights that care needs to be taken in analysing these results for 
although the F statistic for all the groups reveals that the overall equations are 
significant, the Durbin Watson statistic reveals positive autocorrelation. This 
implies that the parameter estimates are inefficient and the usual hypothesis 
testing procedures are also no longer strictly valid in these situations' . This 
identification of autocorrelation clearly shows that another method of 
estimation is required other than ordinary least squares. 
Transforming these equations into natural logs leads to a few 
changes but not to a significant improvement in the Durbin Watson statistic. 
Despite this transformation into logs severe problems existed for all the groups 
as the DW statistic still posed a problem, still indicating positive serial 
correlation and rendering the estimates inefficient. 
These equations were, therefore, re-estimated using the Cochrane- 
Orcutt iterative procedure (CO). Logs were also taken so that the data followed 
a normal distribution. This was in order to correct for skewness of the data. 
2 see Maddala (1978) p92. 
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The results presented in Table 5.3 show that all the values, with the 
exception of pension fund sales are significant at the 1% level. The R bar 
squared has improved significantly from the previous estimation and its lowest 
value is 89%. The Durbin Watson statistic indicates no real problems of serial 
correlation. 
Insurance companies, pension funds and the combined institutional 
investors all have positive purchase coefficients and negative sales coefficients 
as predicted, showing that as purchasing pressure increases, the level of the 
share prices rise and as selling activity increases the level of share prices fall. 
This was not the case for unit or investment trusts mainly because they play a 
less important role in the economy, due to their overall assets being less than 
those of pension funds and insurance companies. Thus when these two smaller 
groups buy and sell shares their activities are not significant enough to have an 
impact on the general level of share prices. 
From the first row in Table 5.3 it can be seen that if unit trusts 
increase their quarterly purchases by 1% then the FT all-share index increases 
by 0.4%. However, an increase in sales by 1% results in a 0.15% rise. This is 
an unusual result as it would be expected that an increase in selling activity 
would lead to a decline in FT all-share points. The only plausible explanation is 
the one mentioned above in that unit trusts are not large enough to have 
significant effects in depressing prices if they sell. The calculated F statistic 
indicates that the entire relationship is significantly different from zero. The 
absolute values of the t statistics for the coefficients of purchases and sales are 
significant at the 1% level. The value of R2 indicates that 98% of the variation 
in changes in the Index is accounted for by variation in the purchases and sales 
variables relating to unit trusts. Investment trusts tended to follow a similar 
pattern to unit trusts. 
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TABLE 5.3 
COCHRANE ORCUTT METHOD OF ESTIMATION 
FOR THE MODEL: LN It= ßlnP* + ulnSt 
INSTITUTION 
UNIT TRUSTS 
INVESTMENT 
TRUSTS 
ßuR? F stat DW 
0.40* 0.15* 
(1.8) (1.4) 
. 98 3802.5* 1.89 
0.37* 0.65* 
(2.9) (5.2) 
. 89 575.1* 1.97 
INSURANCE 0.18* -0.11* . 97 2563.5* 1.61 
COMPANIES (2.4) (-1.8) 
PENSION 0.22* -0.01 . 98 3769.8* 1.60 
FUNDS (4.8) (-0.35) 
COMBINED 0.13* -0.06* . 98 4575.5* 1.60 
INSTITUTIONS (6.6) (-2.6) 
(t values in parentheses) 
* significant at 5% level. 
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The results for insurance companies are as predicted. The results 
show that a 1% increase in the quarterly purchases of insurance companies will 
lead to a 0.18% rise in the FT all-share index. A 1% increase in sales leads to a 
decline in the FT all-share index by 0.11%. Insurance companies performed 
particularly well in this model with all the variables being significant at the 1% 
level and the overall estimate being significant as well. The R2 was particularly 
high indicating that 97% of the variation in changes in the Index is accounted 
for by variations in the purchases and sales variables relating to insurance 
companies. 
Pension funds followed a similar pattern to insurance companies but 
their sales coefficient was not significant according to the t statistics, however, 
the overall estimation is significant. Combined institutional investors clearly 
followed the predicted pattern revealing that they do have significant effects on 
the general level of share prices. An increase in their quarterly purchases of 1% 
leads to a 0.13% increase in the FT all-share Index. A 1% increase in sales 
over this period leads to a decline in the FT all-share Index of 0.06%. 
The model did not perform as predicted for unit and investment 
trusts. This may be due partly to the changes that have occurred in the 
seventeen year period of this study thus hiding specific factors that have 
affected these institutional investors e. g. the election in 1979 where the 
Conservative party came into power and the subsequent changes in the saving 
of money, particularly the rise in intermediaries. The election in 1979 is taken 
as a single significant event which may have affected these institutional 
investors. 
The next step, therefore, was to apply the test over different time 
periods. Another regression for unit trusts was run taking account the election 
period. It was found that the model behaved as predicted for unit trusts from 
the period 1979 Quarter 4 to 1987 Quarter 4 using the Cochrane Orcutt Iterative 
Method. The results are presented in Table 5.4. 
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TABLE 5.4 
COCHRANE ORCUTT ESTIMATION OF MODEL 
LN INDEX = BLN UTP + uLN UTS 
(period: 1979 04 - 1987 04) 
LN UTP (ß) 0.267* 
(1.8) 
LN UTS (p) -0.023 
(-0.1) 
R bar squared . 98 
F statistic 1946.3* 
Durbin Watson 1.89 
(t values in parentheses :* indicates significant at 5% level) 
LN = natural logs 
UTP = Unit trust purchases 
UTS = Unit trust sales 
113 
The coefficient of ß was positive and significant at the 5% level. 
However, the coefficient of sales although negative was insignificant. The R 
bar squared shows that 98% of the change in the level of share prices is 
explained by the buying and selling activity of unit trusts. the overall equation 
was significant and there were no problems of serial correlation as denoted by 
the Durbin Watson statistic. 
This result shows that this model performs particularly well, in the 
case of unit trusts, after 1979. There were changes in the economy due to a 
change in government. There were also changes in tax laws affecting 
institutional investors. Tax relief was removed from all forms of insurance 
policies except life assurance, so buying insurance was no longer a means of 
evading tax. Thus alternative forms of saving eg unit trusts increased in 
popularity. The governments policy to reduce inflation encouraged saving and 
for the smaller investor a particularly advantageous method of saving was to 
invest in unit trusts. This was advantageous because it meant that they could 
hold a diverse portfolio and benefit from professional management of their 
money without high transaction costs (see chapter 2). 
With the above result in mind it is essential to test the stability of the 
data which can be done by applying the Chow testa . It is necessary to know if 
there is any significant difference in the data between the period analysed ie, 
1979 Q4 - 1987 Q4 and the remaining sample. The method used is described in 
Koutsoyiannis (1977), and from applying the Chow test no structural changes 
were found to exist in the data. This shows our results to be valid. 
3 see Koutsoyiannis (1977) p164 
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There still remains one major limitation in that the study is not 
complete unless the model is re-estimated, taking account of inflation. In the 
present model, purchases and sales of the same number of units in each 
quarter, will increase in monetary terms as the All-share Index rises leading to 
spurious correlation. The solution is to divide purchases and sales by the Index 
for each quarter, in order to remove built-in correlation by converting 
purchases and sales in real terms. To do this the following model must be set 
up: 
LN It = ßILNPt+NILNSt 
where ILNPt = LNPt / Indext 
and ILNSt = LNSt / Indext 
This will adjust for changing price levels. This was an important 
step to take as without it the model is limited and does not give any valuable 
information about the state of the market. The results are set out in Table 5.5. 
All four groups have a positive purchases coefficient and a negative sales 
coefficient both of which are significant at the 5% level according to the t 
statistics. The only exceptions were insurance company purchases and pension 
fund sales, however, in both these cases the coefficients were not significant. 
The overall equations are significant in each case according to the F statistics. 
The results for insurance companies coincide with those of Dobbins 
and Witt who also have an insignificant purchases coefficient. This does 
suggest, however, that institutional investors on the whole do have significant 
effects on the general level of share prices. Adjusting for inflation has not 
changed the direction of our results or the conclusions with regard to the 
influence of institutional investors' equity buying and selling on share prices. 
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TABLE 5.5 
COCHRANE ORCUTT METHOD OF ESTIMATION FOR THE 
MODEL: LN It = ßI InPt + id InSt 
INSTITUTION ß A R2 F stat DW 
UNIT 1.21* -1.81* . 97 1298.5 1.39 
TRUSTS (2.7) (-2.7) 
INVESTMENT 0.98* -1.38* . 97 1451.7 1.42 
TRUSTS (3.1) (-4.2) 
INSURANCE 0.10 -0.85* . 97 1506.3 1.63 
COMPANIES (-0.2) (-2.8) 
PENSION 0.86* -0.16 . 97 1295.2 1.37 
FUNDS (2.7) (-0.6) 
(t values in parenthesis) 
* significant at 5% level 
where 
I In Pt = In Pt / Indext 
and I In St = In St / Indext 
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5.4 - DISCUSSION 
This chapter set out to see what effects the trading activities of 
institutional investors have on the general level of share prices. It also 
attempted to identify a market leader from the four major groups of institutional 
investors. 
On the whole the results were as predicted, showing that as the 
purchasing activity of institutional investors increases, so does the level of 
share prices and as the selling activity increases, the level of share prices falls. 
This was especially true for pension funds and insurance companies because 
these two groups have a significant share of the market. It was also the case for 
the institutional investors combined, thus highlighting their importance when 
they move together. Unit trusts and investment trusts play a less important role 
in affecting the level of share prices. 
The evidence presented here that the institutional investors 
combined, do alter the Index of share prices significantly, means that they are 
vitally important to the stock market and that their activities play a crucial role. 
If they move together they may have significant effects on the prices of the 
companies in which they move into or leave. The evidence of high serial 
correlation shows that they do move together, thus providing further evidence 
to support Shiller's fads model. 
These findings have significant implications on the efficient market 
hypothesis. The EMH is not rejected here because all its conditions have not 
been tested (see chapter 4), however, its degree of efficiency is questioned. If 
the Grossman and Stiglitz view is taken then the high transaction costs ensure 
that institutional investors will have an advantage, particularly over smaller 
traders who cannot afford to expend the transaction costs. 
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The model performs particularly well for both pension funds and 
insurance companies, so they may be identified as market leaders. This shows 
a change in the degree of influence institutional investors have on the capital 
market. The mid-sixties to mid-seventies as analysed by Dobbins and Witt 
experienced influence from the institutional investors but no one group was 
strong enough to be identified as market leaders. From 1970 to 1987 there has 
been a growth in their impact on the economy as revealed by these results. The 
identification of market leaders is further evidence of inefficiency in the 
markets. 
One issue to address at this stage is whether this growing influence 
of the institutional investors is against public interest. If their potential power to 
influence share prices makes them react against the public interest one solution 
could be more rigorous legislation from the government. The government 
could demand that the institutional investors invest in a certain percentage of 
smaller companies and new ventures which are UK based. This would reduce 
the bullish effect they have on the share prices of the companies which they 
tend to favour. A less severe solution would be to encourage further disclosure 
of their activities and their performance figures, particularly in the case of 
pension funds. This may, however, lead to an even greater problem of 'short- 
termism' where fund managers try to outperform each other in order to attract 
more finance, in the face of greater disclosure and quicker judgement. 
Institutional investors now hold nearly two thirds of shares in the 
market and so their movements are of great importance. The study predicted a 
relationship between the trading activities of institutional investors and the 
general level of share prices. The results were not unusual, one would expect 
the selling activities of such large holders of shares to depress prices and their 
buying activities to increase prices. What is significant is the effects this 
influence has on information, smaller companies and new ventures. It is also 
of interest to see whether institutional investors do indeed move together in a 
herd. 
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In order to throw some light on this the equations are estimated in 
the light of a more advanced econometric technique - cointegration. 
5.5 - COINTEGRATION TESTS. 
This study has already shown that institutional investors affect the 
general price level. Now it can be seen whether this is the case in the long run. 
Cointegration techniques are applied to test whether there is a close, long run, 
stable relationship between the behaviour of institutional investors and the 
general price level ie the Index; and whether the institutional investors 
themselves move together. If this is so, then it sheds further light on the herd- 
like behaviour discussed in the previous chapter. 
It is frequently of interest to test whether a set of variables are 
cointegrated. Economic theory often suggests that certain theoretical variables 
should not diverge from one another to a great extent, at least in the long run, 
although they may drift apart in the short run or according to seasonal factors. 
DATA: 
The study investigates the existence of these relationships on a 
quarterly basis over a seventeen year period (1970 - 1987). The recent concept 
of cointegration is applied between variables in order to form an error 
correction model. The data used are the same as used in the above regressions 
in this chapter except that some transformations have been made: - 
1) TURNOVER = PURCHASES + SALES 
2) NET ACQUISITIONS = PURCHASES - SALES 
Turnover is used in order to establish whether if one institutional 
investor is dealing frequently; they all are. Net acquisitions capture the net 
movements of the institutional investors and if, as assumed, the institutional 
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investors are the dominant players in the market they would be expected to 
have significant affects on the general price level. This was shown in the 
previous section. Here, the study attempts to confirm this and also to show that 
the relationship does hold in the long run. 
TESTING FOR COINTEGRATION 
For a formal definition of cointegration see Engle and Granger 
(1987) and also Antoniou and Garrett (1989). 
The first step in testing for cointegration is to run the cointegrating 
regression: 
Xt =A+ßyt+et 
and test the hypothesis that the residuals et are I(1). This is testing the null 
hypothesis of non-cointegration. Three statistics are used to test the null of I(1) 
residuals: the Cointegrating Durbin Watson (CRDW), the Dickey - Fuller (DF) 
and Augmented Dickey - Fuller (ADF) statistics: - 
1) The Cointegrated Durbin Watson (CRDW). 
After running the cointegrated regression, the Durbin Watson 
statistic is tested to see if the residuals appear stationary. If they are non- 
stationary, the Durbin Watson will approach zero and thus the test rejects non- 
cointegration if the Durbin Watson is too big. If the Durbin Watson statistic is 
greater than 0.386 then we must reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration 
between the two variables. 
2) Dickey - Fuller (DF). 
This tests the residuals from the cointegrated regression by running 
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an auxilliary regression as described by Dickey and Fuller. It also assumes the 
first order model is correct. The test applied is the t test and if the t value 
exceeds the critical t value of -3.37 then cointegration does exist. 
3) Augmented Dickey - Fuller (ADF). 
This test allows far more dynamics in the Dickey Fuller regression 
and consequently is over parameterized in the first order case but correctly 
specified in the higher order cases. Once again there is at test and if t< -3.17 
thenthe null hypothesis of non cointegration is rejected. 
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RESULTS 
TABLE 5.6 - RESULTS OF CO-INTEGRATING REGRESSION 
(TURNOVER). DEPENDENT VARIABLE : INDEX 
6 CRDW DF ADF 
UT 0.12 0.1225 -0.3220 -1.4657 
IT* 0.46 1.2797 -5.5153 -4.8410 
Ic 0.10 0.9198 -2.8637 -2.3787 
PF 0.05 0.3675 -2.5147 -2.2978 
II 0.02 0.7963 -0.5618 -1.9475 
* Cointegrated 
a) CRDW Is the DW statistic from the cointegrating regression. 
Reject the null of the non cointegration if DW > 0.386. 
b) DF Is the Dickey-Fuller test for a unit root. Reject the null of 
I(1) residuals if the t statistic < -3.37. 
c) ADF Is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for a unit root. 
Reject the null if t<3.17. 
Table 5.6 shows that there is no evidence of cointegration between 
the turnover of institutional investors (purchases + sales) and the FT All Share 
Index for any single group or the combined institutional investors. The only 
exception was investment trusts. The evidence of no long term relationship 
between the institutional investors and the Index may be because turnover does 
not capture the impact of market movements. Investment trusts were the 
exception, possibly because they do not opt for buy and hold policies and so 
their frequent buying and selling affects the general price level. 
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TABLE 5.7 
RESULTS OF COINTEGRATING REGRESSION 
(NET ACQUISITIONS) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: INDEX. 
ß CRDW DF ADF 
UT* 0.91 0.5352 -3.3762 
IT 0.51 0.0680 0.1514 
IC* 0.68 1.0115 -4.5627 
PF* 0.37 1.2909 -5.7977 
II 0.22 1.0954 -4.9412 
(See Table 5.6 for key) 
Table 5.7 differs significantly from Table 5.6 in that there is 
evidence of cointegration being present in all cases of the net acquisitions of 
institutional investors (purchases - sales) and the Index. The only exception 
was investment trusts where no cointegration was present even after the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller test. A closer relationship between net acquisitions of 
institutional investors and the Index is expected because all the net movements 
are captured and these affect the general price levels. Institutional investors are 
dominant players in the market as has been shown in an earlier section in this 
chapter, and so one can expect their movements to have significant affects on 
the Index. 
123 
Additionally, tests for cointegration have also been carried out 
between the institutional investors themselves. These tests have been carried 
out systematically for all combinations of the institutional investors, for both 
turnover and net acquisitions. The reason for carrying out these further tests is 
to see if the institutional investors move together in the long run, thus shedding 
light on the herd like behaviour theories. 
A strong relationship is expected in all cases because institutional 
investors do have a tendency to move together due to similarities in 
information, aims etc. as discussed in previous chapters. There are bound to be 
short run divergences because of the differing time horizons between the 
groups of institutional investors eg unit trusts operate on a smaller time horizon 
than pension funds. This is why the cointegration technique is so important, 
because it allows long run components of variables to obey equilibrium 
relationships, whilst short run components are allowed a flexible dynamic 
specification (see Antoniou and Garrett (1989)). 
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TABLE 5.8 
TURNOVER - DEPENDENT VARIABLE: UNIT TRUSTS. 
ß CRDW DF ADF 
IT* 3.37 0.7310 -3.8801 
IC* 0.79 1.4353 -6.0255 
PF* 0.44 0.2836 -0.2540 6.2935 
II 0.21 0.4274 -2.4890 
TURNOVER - DEPENDENT VARIABLE: INVESTMENT 
TRUSTS 
ß CRDW DF 
IC* 0.21 1.0531 -4.6683 
PF* 0.11 1.2829 -5.5574 
II* 0.05 1.0338 -4.9428 
ADF 
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TURNOVER - DEPENDENT VARIABLE : INSURANCE 
COMPANIES. 
6 CRDW DF ADF 
PF* 0.53 1.5962 -6.8504 
11* 0.25 1.7224 -7.3881 
TURNOVER - DEPENDENT VARIABLE : PENSION FUNDS. 
ß CRDW DF ADF 
II$ 0.47 1.2508 -4.3197 
Table 5.8 presents the results of the relationships of the turnover of 
institutional investors with one another. Cointegration was detected in all cases 
except for the combination of unit trusts and institutional investors. This may 
be because unit trusts, unlike the other institutional investors, do not have a 
buy and hold policy. 
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TABLE 5.9 
NET ACOUISITIONS " DEPENDENT VARIABLE : UNIT 
TRUSTS 
ß CRDW DF ADF 
IT 0.78 0.4369 2.9373 
IC* 0.55 1.3075 -5.7861 
PF* 0.35 1.6307 -6.9432 
11* 0.21 1.9237 -8.0606 
NET ACQ UISITIONS - DEPENDENT VARIABLE: INVESTMENT 
TRUSTS 
ß CRDW DF ADF 
IC* 0.04 1.4585 -6.3487 
PF* -0.0008 1.5109 -6.4966 
11* 0.01 1.5458 -6.6472 
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NET ACQUISITIONS - DEPENDENT VARIABLE: INSURANCE 
COMPANIES. 
ß CRDW DF ADF 
PF* 0.36 1.9355 -8.4910 
II* 0.23 1.8787 -7.9471 
NET ACQUISITIONS - DEPENDENT VARIABLE: PENSION 
FUNDS. 
0 CRDW DF ADF 
II* 0.53 2.0536 -8.6676 
Table 5.9 shows the results of the net acquisitions of the institutional 
investors with one another. The results show that cointegration was present in 
all cases except for investment trusts and unit trusts. The results overall do 
imply the existence of herd-like behaviour as we have established a long run 
stable relationship bet%vccn the institutional investors. 
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5.6 - SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Institutional investors have been alleged to cause major swings in 
share prices and to move together in a `herd' due to similarities in their 
information. In this chapter a time series model for the years 1970 - 1987 was 
empirically tested in an attempt to explain movements in the FT All-Share 
Index in terms of institutional equity activity. 
The results suggest that the trading activities of the institutional 
investors do influence the general level of share prices in the UK stock market, 
with purchases resulting in price increases and sales resulting in price declines. 
The removal of the effects of inflation from the original data has not altered the 
conclusion that institutional investors' buying and selling activities have an 
influence on share prices. This highlights the potential for institutional 
investors to bias share price movements towards the firms they invest in and 
away from those they leave, and consequently to affect the allocation of 
resources. 
In an attempt to analyse whether there is any evidence that the 
institutional investors do move in the same direction in the long run, a recent 
econometric technique of cointegration was applied. The results suggest the 
existence of long run stable relationships between the variables. However, no 
conclusive evidence was found regarding the existence of fads or herd-like 
behaviour. 
The main limitation of this study is that it is too narrow. It has 
focused solely on the movements of institutional investors as if they totally 
control the market, lt is important to emphasise that they are just one force 
affecting share prices and they do not account for the whole impact. The 
change in prices may be driven by other factors e. g. expectations, interest rates 
etc. To analyse the specific effect of institutional investors on share prices it 
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would be necessary to look at pressure on share prices at the specific times 
when the institutional investors either purchased or sold shares. 
This chapter does emphasise that as large holders of shares 
institutional investors do have the potential to influence the general level of 
activity. The following chapter attempts to test whether the switching activities 
of institutional investors from one type of asset to another also affects the 
general level of economic activity. 
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CHAPTER 6- THE SWITCHING ACTIVITIES OF 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 
6.1 - INTRODUCTION 
This study has discussed the goals, incentives and the competitive 
structure within which institutional investors operate and which influences their 
investment decisions. In chapter 3 the variables attracting institutional investors 
into certain companies were analysed and in the previous chapter it was shown 
that the buying and selling activities of institutional investors do affect market 
prices. Here, the study extends this by investigating whether switching from 
one type of asset to another, e. g. from property into equities, will also affect 
the market as a whole. It attempts to analyse how institutional investors balance 
their portfolios in order to establish the demand they themselves create for 
assets. 
It is believed that the activities of institutional investors switching 
from one type of asset to another will have an affect on the market, however, if 
the market is efficient then this cannot be the case. 
This is an empirical time series study for the years 1965-1984 in the 
case of pension funds and insurance companies and 1965-1991 in the case of 
investment trusts. The chapter is set out as follows: Section two outlines the 
past studies analysing the asset distribution of institutional investors. It looks 
at each of the four groups separately in order to see if their investment choice 
differs due to their different goals and incentives. Section three discusses the 
data and the reseach methodology and also any limitations in the data. Section 
four presents the research results and discusses their validity using econometric 
analysis. Section five analyses the implications of the results and ties them with 
the rest of the thesis. Finally section six summarises the chapter and states the 
conclusions. 
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6.2 - PAST PAPERS 
INSURANCE COMPANIES 
The portfolios of the industry are generally spread across a spectrum 
of different assets with government securities having a major role. Property, 
ordinary shares, mortgages, loans and cash also play an important part in their 
asset allocation decisions. Most companies have also built up a considerable 
volume of assets in foreign markets. 
TABLE 6.21: DISTRIBUTION OF UK INSURANCE COMPANY 
ASSETS AT YEAR END (%1 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Public Sector 
securities 30 27 25 22 24 20 
Company 
Secunties 46 50 53 58 56 57 
Other 
Investments 24 23 22 20 21 23 
(Source: Foley Table 6.4 p179) 
Since the 1960's and the so called `cult of the equity' there has been 
a shift in allocation towards equities - and this has continued in the 1980's: 
ordinary shares accounted for 46% of total assets of insurance companies in 
1983 and by 1988 some 57% (see Table 6.21). This partly reflects a bull 
market which saw equity values rising faster than the other sectors - hence after 
the 1987 Crash the share of equities fell back to only 56%. However, this rise 
in equity values is only part of the story, as clearly there have also been policy 
decisions to increase the weight of equities in the overall portfolio. By 1987 
and 1988 company securities were accounting for nearly two-thirds of the net 
investment undertaken by the companies. 
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It is clear from the table that public sector securities represent a 
considerable proportion of invested assets and while this total has been 
declining (from 30% to 20%) it is still expected to remain an important arena 
for UK insurance company funds. 
Insurance companies as a whole have been discussed, however, 
they can be divided into general insurance companies and life assurance 
companies, where the latter have the lions' share of funds. For general 
insurance companies, company securities declined in the share of net 
investment from 85% in 1966 to 23% in 1981 (Dodds and Dobbins (1985)) 
with a marked preference for government securities, cash and short term 
assets. For life assurance companies ordinary shares increased in importance 
while debentures fell. Life offices doubled their share of holdings of property 
and substantially reduced their share of loans and mortgages. Their overseas 
company security holdings since 1976 reveal stability. 
PENSION FUNDS 
The pattern of asset holding in pension funds has shifted very 
markedly toward the corporate sector: government securities still play a 
significant but declining role in the overall allocation. Similar to the case for 
insurance companies, much of the growth in company securities is a 
consequence of the rise in the equity values over this period. It is clear from the 
disposition of new inflows of money that equities receive the largest amount. 
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TABLE 6.22: DISTRIBUTION OF SELF-ADMINISTERED 
PENSION FUND ASSETS AT YEAR END (%) 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Public Sector 
securities 21 19 18 16 16 13 
Company 
Securities 62 65 68 72 71 74 
Other 
Investments 17 16 14 12 13 13 
(Source: Foley Table 6.4 p179) 
This re-orientation of pension fund portfolios in the UK away from 
government securities pre-dates the contraction in the gilts market. 
The last ten years have seen increased commitment to equities at the 
expense of exposure to both UK Bonds and UK property, which has steadily 
declined over the period. This alteration in balance reflects both the high level 
of commitment of new money to equities and the generally superior returns 
available from the equity markets during this last ten year period (1980-1990). 
The main difference in the asset distribution between the pension 
funds and the life assurance companies is that life assurance companies are 
much heavier in fixed interest, including gilts, debentures and loans, and 
correspondingly lighter in equities than pension funds. The difference arises 
because life assurance companies must fulfil contracts expressed in terms of 
fixed sum assured, whereas pension funds generally provide benefits related to 
final earnings. 
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Table 6.23 reveals the general strength of the UK equity market 
which has resulted in a steady increase in commitment over the period. A 
significant proportion of the cash flow was committed to overseas equities in 
the earlier years. In recent periods, flows have been such that a weighting of 
around 20% would be maintained. 
After commiting significant amounts of new money to UK bonds in 
the earlier years, funds have disinvested in the four most recent years. In the 
three latest years disinvestment from UK bonds has coincided with increasing 
investment in overseas bonds. As a result, the overall bond weighting at the 
end of December 1990 was around 9%. Whilst the average overseas bond 
weighting at the end of 1990 was 3%, it should be noted that amongst the 69% 
of funds which held these investments the mean weighting was 7%. 
Index-linked attracted new money in the first five years following 
their introduction, in the last four years marginal disinvestment has generally 
taken place. UK property has seen net investment in all but one of the years, 
but the investment flows are a smaller proportion of the total flows than 
property is of the total assets ie. the flows represent a policy shift from 
property. Cash/ Other investments was held at around 4% of assets up until 
1987 since when the proportion has now incresed to 7%. 
Pension funds can be divided into three main groups - private, local 
authority and other public sector funds. the largest of these being private 
funds. Below we look in turn at the asset distribution of each type of fund 
from the period 1962 - 1990. 
i) Private Funds' 
The proportion of assets held in equities, UK and Overseas, rose 
from under 50% in 1962 to nearly 60% in 1972. The sharp fall in the UK 
equity market in 1973 and 1974 reduced this proportion to under 40%, but the 
All figures are from Phillips and Drew Fund Management (1991) 
136 
subsequent recovery increased it again to around 52%, a level which was 
maintained between 1975 and 1980. The rise in equity markets and the big 
move into overseas equities more recently, caused an increase in the equity 
proportion up to 74% at the end of 1989, with some fall back to 72% at the end 
of 1990. The peak for the equity proportion was in the summer of 1987. 
The biggest change in the 1980's was the increase in the proportion 
of assets in overseas equities, up from 5% in1979 to a peak of 18% by end of 
1989. This follows directly from the abolition of exchange controls in late 
1979. 
The weighting of fixed interest fell from 51% in 1962 to under 26% 
in 1972 reflecting rising interest rates and a generally low level of net 
investment. During the 1970's, the proportion held in fixed interest stayed 
fairly constant at around 28% of assets, indicating that a poor performance was 
being offset by a high level of net investment, as the government funded public 
spending by issues of gilt-edged stock. Subsequently, as government issues 
ceased and public sector debt repayment emerged, the fixed interest proportion 
fell to 9% at the end of 1990. Conversely, index-linked securities, first issued 
in 1981, constituted 2% of assets at the end of 1990. 
The recent fall in the fixed interest holdings by pension funds has 
been particularly sharp since, in the light of current ideas on asset allocation, 
pension funds have been willing sellers of fixed interest, as the counter parties 
to government buying. In contrast life assurance companies have not been 
sellers of fixed interest on a large scale. 
Property investment increased in popularity over the 1970's, as 
pension funds moved into a sector which they saw as a hedge against inflation. 
The property proportion rose to a peak of 16% in1981, compared with less 
than 5% in 1967. Since 1981, reduced net investment and a poor investment 
performance have caused a fall in the property proportion to 8%. 
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Cash built up to 20% of assets at the end of 1974, partly because of 
the very depressed values attributable to the other investment sectors. The cash 
weighting subsequently fell and has been around 5% in recent years. In 
summary, the key features of the asset distribution are the persistently high 
equity proportion and the recent move towards greater diversification of 
investment media. 
ii) Local Authority Funds 
The general trend in the investment of local authority funds has been 
in most respects similar to those for private funds. During most of the period 
the proportion in gilts has been significantly higher than for private sector 
funds, largely as a result of the legal restrictions on investment powers. The 
relaxation of the local authority funds' investment powers in 1974 resulted in 
some move towards a more similar investment approach to that of the private 
funds. Now the clearest differences between the local authority and private 
sector funds are that the local authority funds are a little heavier in overseas 
equities and a little lighter in property. 
iii) Other Public Sector Funds. 
This principally consists of nationalised industry funds. The asset 
distribution between sectors shows a similar pattern to that of the private 
sector, although the swings between investment sectors have been somewhat 
greater. These funds were slower in building up the overseas equity sector than 
private sector funds and they also give a greater weighting in property than the 
private funds. 
These funds are dominated by a very small number of very large 
funds to a greater extent than the other sectors. This feature affects their 
management style. In particular, they exhibit a high proportion of property 
holdings in relation to the size of the funds. 
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UNIT TRUST 
Many trusts confine their investment to the domestic market offering 
to invest in equities or a mix of equities and fixed interest securities. Others 
offer a geograghical specialisation by country or by area such as Japan, USA, 
Australia or Europe, the Pacific, Asia. Yet others specialise by sector e. g. 
money market funds, smaller companies, recovery stocks, technology, 
property, commodities etc. Thus unit trusts encompass a variety of investor 
preferences including exposure to overseas markets within the context of a 
reasonably diversified portfolio. 
INVESTMENT TRUSTS 
Investment trusts have more room for manoeuvre in terms of 
investment policy than unit trusts, because they are a conventional company 
and are thus not constrained legally by the terms of a trust deed. Also a unit 
trust which performs badly and fails to satisfy investors will face growing net 
redemptions and this, by reducing the size of the fund puts pressure on the 
manager to find a solution quickly. The managers of an investment trust 
however can alter the composition of the portfolio much more readily: not only 
is there no deed but shareholder pressure is unlikely to be felt so immediately. 
Dissatisfied investors sell their equity in the market not back to the trust and the 
result is simply the substitution of one set of shareholders for another. This 
should allow an investment trust manager to take a longer term view and invest 
in firms which may have poor short term prospects without worrying that a dip 
in share price will generate a shrinkage in capital invested. As investment trusts 
are companies they are not limited to issuing equities; they can issue other sorts 
of capital; e. g. fixed interest bonds may be sold and the proceeds used to 
expand the share portfolio. They can also issue convertible loan stock and 
warrants which give them a great deal of flexibility. The bullish nature of the 
markets in the 1980's led to a considerable growth of issues with warrants 
attached. 
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6.3 - DATA AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY. 
The hypothesis to be tested is that the switching activities of 
institutional investors have an effect on the market. 
The data for insurance companies and pension funds are from the 
Bank of England Quarterly Review (1985). The data are given annually for the 
years 1965 - 1984. The market index values are from CSO Financial Statistics 
for the years 1965 - 1984 and are taken from the column headed FT All-Share 
Index (April 1962 =100). 
In the case of insurance companies data were only for life assurance 
and not general insurance, so care must be taken when interpreting the figures. 
This is not too severe a limitation because life assurance makes up the bulk of 
total insurance business and so serves to give a clear idea of the activities of 
insurance companies. 
Similarly, in the case of pension funds, the data only represent 
private pension funds and not local authority funds or public funds. Private 
pension funds are the largest of the three groups and so are of more use to 
analyse. 
The pension fund portfolio data prepared by the Bank cover thirty 
eight types of asset: to ease exposition the data are aggregated into larger 
groups, chosen with a view to presenting an aggregation that is reasonabbly 
close to that used by managers when making strategic decisions about the 
overall structure of a portfolio. To this end the criteria for aggregation should 
be such as to provide groupings within which assets can be regarded as more 
or less homogeneous. However, criteria in practice will vary according to the 
concerns and aims of investors and thus a classification scheme which matches 
the criteria used by investors may not yield perfectly homogeneous groupings. 
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There are several difficulties in analysing the portfolio data 
aggregated into groups. The structure of a fund's portfolio changes from year 
to year, partly because the managers plan their investment decisions to achieve 
such changes, and partly because the value of their existing investment 
changes. Therefore, it is insufficient to look only at the changes in the overall 
structure of the funds' portfolio; it is necessary to consider how those changes 
came about. The new integrated accounts break down changes into those 
reflecting cash flow (ie conscious investment behaviour), changes in valuation 
of the initial portfolio during each period, and a residual element. This last 
factor reflects not only measurement errors but also revaluation of assets 
purchased during the period in question. 
In the case of investment trusts a random sample of 30 investment 
trusts for the years 1965 - 1991 were chosen from Datastream. Data were 
collected of the portfolio distribution for these companies which was in the 
form of bonds and equities. The Index was obtained from CSO Financial 
Statistics as above. 
The main limitations of the data were that, in the case of pension 
funds and insurance companies, the data were only available up to 1984. 
However, this provides a spread of 19 years and so is enough to detect any 
relationship between the market index and the movements of the institutional 
investors' portfolio's. 
In the case of investment trusts the main limitation is that the sample 
consisted of only 30 companies. The reason for this was due to the source of 
the data ie Datastream which only gave data going back to 1965 for a limited 
number of companies. It was judged essential to go back to that period for any 
meaningful interpretation to be made regarding the activities of the investment 
trusts and their effects on the market index. This also enabled comparison of 
the results more directly with those for pension funds and insurance 
companies. 
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It is possible now to introduce each type of asset within the portfolio 
of pension funds and insurance companies that are being tested in this study. 
These assets are represented in the above two graphs. 
1) FIXED INTEREST SECURITIES. 
These include British Government securities and other fixed interest 
for the period of our study ie 1965 - 1984. 
In the case of insurance companies the share of fixed interest in their 
portfolios fell from 35% to 28%. The decline set in from 1968 to a low point 
of 24% in 1974. Recovery to 33% in 1977 was followed by fluctuations 
around 30% until a fall in 1984. 
For pension funds there was a much sharper and more substantial 
decline than for insurance companies ie from 46% at the beginning of the 
period to 20%. This was a continuation of a trend established in the 1950's as 
the `cult of equity' took hold. 
There were also very strong similarities in the pattern of change in 
the structure of fixed-interest portfolios, from being fairly evenly spread across 
gilts and other forms of security to being dominated by gilts. In addition, from 
1981, index-linked gilts rapidly acquired a noticeable share in the fixed-interest 
portfolio. 
An important influence on the bond market was the very heavy 
government funding programme from 1976. This pushed up gilt yields to 
levels corporate and local authority treasurers were unwilling to match and 
probably also, given the declining importance of such securities in pension 
fund portfolios, satisfied total pension fund demand for fixed-interest securities 
of all kinds. Insurance companies were less accommodating to the decline of 
gilts in the portfolio from 1965 to 1973 than were pension funds. For much of 
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this period, insurance companies devoted to gilts a share of cash flow 
disproportionate to their portfolio share, but this did little more than offset the 
decline of real gilt values caused by inflation. Portfolio share fell both because 
of the appreciation of other asset values and because of the revaluation effects 
of rising interest rates. In the later 1970's the returns on gilts began to look 
very attractive and pension funds sharply increased their purchases with the 
expansion of the government funding programme and gilts increased in 
importance in both types of portfolio. Pension funds became heavy buyers 
from 1973 while insurance companies delayed their move back into gilts until 
1975. 
Between 1980 and 1984 the share of gilts fell from 27% to 25% in 
insurance company portfolios and in pension funds from 23% to 18%. 
Pension fund demand was probably limited by the very heavy returns on 
equities. In particular, heavy investment in overseas assets took place at this 
time. 
2) EQUITIES 
In insurance company portfolios the share of equities rose as high as 
42% at end-1972 and fell as low as 18% at end-1974, and in pension funds as 
high as 53% at end-1972 and as low as 33% at end-1974. The share of equities 
increased sharply in 1968, fell back a little to 1970 and then bounced back to 
end-1972, particularly strongly in the case of insurance companies. The stock 
market collapse of 1973-1974, in the face of price and dividend controls, the 
oil price shock and great economic and political uncertainty, sharply reduced 
the value of pension fund equity holdings and thus the total value of pension 
fund portfolios and increased the importance of other assets. Pension funds 
actually dis-invested in ordinary shares in 1973 and 1974, whilst insurance 
companies continued to invest, but at a lower rate than in the previous two 
peak years. 
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The recovery of stock prices in 1975 pushed pension fund equity 
holdings back to the share held in 1970 before prices boomed and collapsed. It 
took until 1983 for insurance companies to regain their 1970 share. 
3)PROPERTY 
Both pension funds and insurance companies were concerned to 
make investments which provide a hedge against inflation and so increased 
their exposure to property. The share of property in pension fund portfolios 
increased from 3% at end-1965 to a peak of 19% in 1981, before falling back 
to 11% at end-1984. In the insurance company portfolio the property share 
increased from 9% to 24% at end- 1979, dropping back to 17% at end-1984. 
The relative importance of investment in property increased sharply in 1973-74 
with the stock market crash and the portfolio share of property increased 
because of this and because of the fall in the value of equity holdings. 
Insurance companies reduced the proportion of cash flow going into 
property from 1975, probably due to the property market collapse of 1974-75, 
but the portfolio share of property increased reflecting the large capital gains 
available, from 1977 until 1979. In contrast the importance of property in the 
pension fund portfolio declined to 1977 but recovered after 1980. In the early 
1980's property declined in both portfolios as values stagnated or declined. 
4) LOANS 
In 1965 loans were an important part of insurance company 
portfolios, accounting for 19% of assets. In pension funds they were 
unimportant accounting for 2% of assets and by 1984 this share had fallen to 
0.2%. In insurance company portfolios loans increased a little to 1966, but 
subsequently declined almost continuously. This was due to the declining real 
value of assets fixed in nominal terms and an increased demand for variable- 
rate loans, as opposed to the fixed rates insurance companies had traditionally 
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offered. A temporary halt to the decline was seen in 1973-74. This was partly 
due to the fall in the value of the total portfolio as stock prices collapsed. In 
particular house purchase loans and loans on company policies increased, 
probably as the effects of the residential property boom forced purchasers to 
seek additional sources of finance. Insurance companies may have been willing 
to respond to the demand at a time when new investment opportunities were 
limited due to the loss of faith in the equity market. 
5) OVERSEAS ASSETS 
One of the most significant developments in the structure of pension 
fund portfolios did not begin until 1979. Until then overseas assets had only 
been of minor importance. In the insurance company portfolio their share had 
fluctuated between 3% and 6%, and in pension funds between 3% and 7%. By 
end-1984, they represented 12% of insurance company assets and 14% of 
pension fund assets, having risen to 16% in 1983. This rapid increase suggests 
that until their abolition of exchange control regulations in 1979 they had been 
having a constraining effect on managers. The strength of sterling during this 
period was also an influence and the fall in investment in 1983-84 probably 
reflected the subsequent weakening of sterling which made overseas 
investment expensive and increased the value of overseas assets. 
According to a WM Computer Services study there is evidence that 
overseas investment had greater returns with lower portfolio volatility risk. 
Overseas investment had the added advantage of allowing participation in the 
economies of those countries enjoying faster rates of economic growth than the 
UK. 
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Now that the independent variables have been introduced a model is 
set up where the independent variables are regressed against the market index 
in an attempt to analyse whether they do indeed move the market index. The 
model is as follows: 
I=a+bX1+cX2+... gX6 
Where I is the market index 
a is the constant term 
b, c ... g are the coefficients of the independent variables 
X1 ... X6 are the independent variables - equity, fixed interest securities, 
government securities, property, loans and overseas assets. 
Having collected the data the first step was to calculate the difference 
from one year to the next for all the variables and then run OLS regressions 
with the dependent variable being the Index. Diagnostic tests were applied 
throughout to test the validity of the data. 
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6.4 - RESEARCH RESULTS 
TABLE 6.1 - PENSION FUNDS. 
OLS REGRESSIONS: DEPENDENT VARIABLE - INDEX 
REGRESSORS COEFFICIENT 
C 34.05* 
(3.8) 
EQUITY 3.74* 
(1.7) 
FIXED INTEREST 9.14* 
(1.6) 
GOVERNMENT -5.50* 
(-1.6) 
PROPERTY -6.34* 
(-1.7) 
LOANS 18.51 
(0.68) 
OVERSEAS 4.77 
(1.01) 
R2 0.67 
DW 1.48 
F(6,12) 4.21 
(t Values in parentheses) 
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TABLE 6.2 - INSURANCE COMPANIES 
OLS REGRESSIONS: DEPENDENT VARIABLE - INDEX. 
REGRESSOR COEFFICIENT 
C 23.03* 
(2.1) 
EQUITY 2.74 
(0.3) 
FIXED INTEREST 4.35 
(0.4) 
GOVERNMENT -2.54 
(-0.2) 
PROPERTY -4.80 
(-0.4) 
LOANS -1.85 
(-0.1) 
OVERSEAS 9.98 
(0.7) 
R2 0.73 
DW 1.52 
F(6,12) 5.60 
(t Values in parentheses) 
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TABLE 6.21 - INSURANCE COMPANIES. 
OLS REGRESSIONS: INDEPENDENT VARIABLE - INDEX. 
REGRESSOR COEFFICIENT 
C 36.15* 
(4.1) 
EQUITY 5.54* 
(4.8) 
FIXED INTEREST 18.46* 
(2.1) 
GOVERNMENT -2.8 
(-1.07) 
R2 0.61 
DW 0.91 
F(3,15) 8.14 
(t Values in parentheses) 
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TABLE 6.3 - INVESTMENT TRUSTS. 
OLS REGRESSION: DEPENDENT VARIABLE - INDEX 
REGRESSOR COEFFICIENT 
C 42.02* 
(2.9) 
EQUITY 11.08* 
(1.3) 
R2 0.07 
DW 1.99 
F(1,24) 1.87 
(t Values in parentheses) 
TABLE 6.4: 
OLS REGRESSION: DEPENDENT VARIABLE - INDEX 
REGRESSOR COEFFICIENT 
C 42.03* 
(2.9) 
BONDS -11.06* 
(-1.3) 
R2 0.07 
DW 1.99 
F(1,24) 1.88 
(t Values in parentheses) 
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Table 6.1 shows the OLS regression results for pension funds for 
the years 1965 - 1984. The dependent variable is the All - Share Market Index 
and the independent variables are equity, fixed interest, government, property, 
loans and overseas securities. As in the previous empirical chapters diagnostic 
tests were applied to check the validity of the results. The main tests applied 
were to test for serial correlation, the correct functional form and 
heteroscedasticity. The model was found to be statistically well specified. 
The results show that the coefficient for equities was positive and 
significant as predicted; fixed interest was also positive and significant; both 
the coefficients for government and property were negative and significant. 
The only results which were not as predicted were loans and overseas 
securities which were positive rather than the expected negative. However, 
these were not found to be significant. 
The R2 shows that these variables account for 67% of the variation 
in the market index. The DW showed no evidence of autocorelation and the F 
statistic showed that the overall equation was significant. 
The results for insurance companies were not as expected. Table 6.2 
shows that although the signs of the coefficients are as expected, they are not 
significant. There are problems of multicollinearity which were detected by 
drawing up a correlation matrix. Consequently some variables were dropped. 
Deleting variables does not necessarily solve the problem and can lead to 
further problems (see Madalla (1985)), however, in this case a test was applied 
for data deletion and the results were found to be valid. Table 6.21 shows the 
coefficient of equity to be positive and significant; fixed interest is also positive 
and significant and government is negative and significant. The R2 shows that 
these variables account for 61% of the variations in the index. The overall 
equation is significant. 
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Tables 6.3 and 6.4 give the results for a time series study of 30 
investment trust companies for the years 1965 - 1991. The dependent variable 
is once again the index. In this case there were only two independent variables 
other than the constant term (c). They could not be put them in one equation 
because there was a high degree of multicollinearity between them. 
Table 6.3 shows that the coefficient for equity was positive and 
significant as expected. The R2 was low which is to be expected as there is 
only one independent variable. Obviously many other factors influence the 
market index other than investment trust equities. The DW is 1.99 which is a 
very statistically sound result and the overall equation is significant. 
Table 6.4 found bonds to be negative and significant. Once again the 
R2 was low for the same reason as above and the overall equation was 
signif icant. 
6.5 - ANALYSIS OF RESULTS. 
The liabilities of pension funds are of a long term nature and 
therefore they are expected to take a long term view of their investments. For 
example the proportion of portfolio held as government securities, has 
remained fairly steady. Throughout the whole data period covered equities 
account for approximately half the portfolio with only mild fluctuations. 
Property has taken up an increasing amount of the portfolio and this move may 
be seen as the pension funds' response to persistent inflation and negative 
`real' interest rates. The only volatile asset group is short term assets. This may 
be because if there is a lack of long term investment of the `right calibre' ie in 
terms of risk and expected return, then the pension funds may invest their 
money short until the right opportunity arises. 
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The review of the portfolio by the pension funds may be seen as a 
reconsideration of the choice between the various fixed interest bearing 
securities (gilts, debentures, loans and mortgages), equity assets (ordinary 
shares, land, property etc. ) and short term assets. The allocation or reallocation 
of the fund into these broad asset groupings may be termed the fund's strategic 
decision. 
It is a fairly standard and reasonable practice to characterise the 
strategic allocation decision in terms of the pension funds possessing a desired 
or optimum balance sheet. The optimum balance sheet consists of a series of 
desired holding levels for the various asset categories, determined by the 
fund's attitude towards risk, its liabilities (the pensions paid and payable to 
beneficiaries and/or their dependents) and the nature of the asset groupings 
themselves with respect to yield and their other attributes (eg income and 
capital risk, in both real and nominal terms, marketability/liquidity, and various 
non yield factors). Of course, this optimum balance sheet is not a directly 
observable phenomenon as there are many factors which prevent the pension 
funds from achieving their desired position. One of the factors that may be 
cited concerns the dominant role played by the pension funds in many financial 
markets. One particular consequence of such dominance is that it is not always 
possible for pension funds to operate freely in some markets without unduly 
affecting the price. This is particularly the case if any fund finds itself requiring 
a large degree of adjustment in the market for a particular asset. A second 
factor is that the right type of security (in terms of risk, holding period etc. ) is 
not always immediately available, so that pension funds may have no option 
but to hold short term assets until better opportunities arise in longer term 
investment categories. Another factor is the various political pressures to direct 
their funds that pension funds (and other large institutional investors) find 
themselves subject to from time to time. 
At the beginning of this data period insurance portfolios were spread 
across British government securities (gilts) and other fixed interest securities 
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(35%), UK equities (28%), loans(19%) and property (9%). In contrast 
pension funds were concentrated in fixed interest securities (41%) and equities 
(47%). In both portfolios, gilts were more heavily represented than other 
forms of fixed interest security. These differences in portfolio structure 
reflected developments in the 1950's. Pension funds, which had been 
overwhelmingly invested in fixed interest securities in the 1940's, had 
increasingly turned to ordinary shares - `the cult of equity' - in the expectation 
of achieving greater positive real returns. The lack of diversification into other 
assets may have reflected in part the constraints of the 1925 Trustee Act on 
funds without specific trust deeds to allow investment in instruments other than 
fixed interest securities and the non retail nature of pension funds, which 
limited the potential of loan business. In contrast, insurance companies 
unconstrained by the Trustee Act, had a wider spread of assets including, in 
particular loans, of which the bulk were to persons. 
Both pension funds and insurance companies faced changes in the 
nature of their liabilities which increased the importance of searching for the 
highest real returns on assets. A major influence on the liability structure, in 
pension business especially, was inflation. This was also a dominant influence 
on investment behaviour because of the impact it had on the real returns on 
different types of asset. However, there were also other significant shocks and 
changes during the period. The most prominent being the two oil price shocks 
in 1973 and 1979; the collapse of the stock market in 1973-74 ( and more 
recently, of course in 1987); price and dividend controls; the rent freeze 
imposed in 1973 and the property market collapse of 1974-75; and the 
abolition of exchange controls in 1979. 
At the beginning of this data period pension funds saw a switch in 
the relative importance of equities and fixed interest securities. In contrast, 
insurance companies saw a small fall in the share of equities, with loans and 
property gaining a little. In 1967 - 72 there was a marked increase in the share 
of equities in both types of fund, with equities being dominant in insurance 
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company potfolios for the first time. This increase was at the expense of fixed 
interest securities and, within insurance company portfolios, loans. Pension 
funds also increased their exposure to property. The years 1973 - 75 saw the 
share of equities fall dramatically, especially in insurance company portfolios, 
in which they moved from being the largest asset group to only the fourth 
largest. In both types of funds, property continued to increase in importance, 
and for insurance companies loans also claimed an increased share. The decline 
of fixed interest securities was temporarily halted. A major development in 
both types of fund was the accumulation of short term assets. By end-1975, 
equities had staged a come back, but in both types of fund property had 
retained its increased importance and there was a far higher proportion of short 
term assets than had been the case before 1972. In 1976-79 fixed interest 
securities experienced a revival and in insurance company portfolios once more 
became the most important asset. Property increased a little in insurance 
company portfolios and loans resumed their long term decline. The major 
feature of 1980-84 was the rapid growth of overseas assets in the portfolios, 
with a falling away of property. In pension fund portfolios, fixed interest 
securities declined and in 1984 equities increased. Fixed interest securities also 
fell a little in insurance company portfolios, equities again became the dominant 
asset, and loans continued to decline in importance. 
The long term trends in both insurance company and pension fund 
portfolios over the whole period were a decline in the share of fixed interest 
securities and an increase in the shares of equities, property and overseas 
assets. In addition, insurance companies reduced the share of loan assets 
which pension funds had never held to a significant degree. However, the 
decline of fixed interest securities was far greater and the growth of equities 
less, in pension funds than in insurance companies. This seems to reflect the 
increasing diversification of pension funds, from a structure more heavily 
weighted towards these two assets than that of insurance companies funds and 
also the continued greater relavance of fixed interest securities, especially gilts, 
to insurance company liabilities. 
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6.6 - SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Institutional investors invest in a variety of assets each with varying 
levels of risk attached to them. The main assets they invest in are UK equities, 
overseas equities, property, fixed-interest securities, government securities 
amongst others. This final empirical chapter attempted to investigate whether 
institutional investors switching from one type of asset into another have an 
effect on the market. A time series study was undertaken for the years 1965- 
1984 in the case of pension funds and insurance companies and 1965-1991 for 
investment trusts. By examining switching activities the study sought to show 
the demand characteristics of these institutional investors and also attempted to 
provide a clearer understanding of the economic conditions that influence their 
investment behaviour. The analysis is intended to provide insight into the 
changing tastes for particular assets. This maybe due to reactions to economic 
events such as market crashes, the property slump and the removal of controls 
for overseas trade etc. 
The results suggest that some of the movements in the market index 
are due to institutional investors switching from one type of asset into another. 
This study suggests, therefore, that not only may institutional 
investors prefer to invest in certain types of companies (e. g, large, well 
established ones) but they may also prefer to invest in certain types of asset. 
This may have significant implications for the economy as a whole because, 
for example, they have the capacity to put pressure on share prices if they 
switch their funds increasingly into equities. It may also have serious effects 
on the property market where switching into property raises its value. This is 
particularly important because property is seen as a hedge against inflation, 
especially in the case of pension funds and insurance companies whose 
liabilities tend to be long term. 
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This is an important result because if the switching activities of 
institutional investors do have substantial effects on the economy as a whole 
then they have the potential to influence sectors of the economy and can thus 
have positive or negative effects. This chapter has not established whether 
institutional investors cause or react to economic events, a mixture of both is 
likely although the causality has not been established. 
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CHAPTER 7- SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has been designed to shed light on certain aspects of 
institutional investor behaviour, particularly their impact on the capital market. 
This is an important issue because the effects of institutional investors are so 
widespread and the potential importance of institutional investors is huge. They 
can influence the type of companies they invest in, move share prices and 
switch in and out of assets, with significant effects on their prices and 
consequently the economy as a whole. 
At the start of this thesis emphasis was placed on how under- 
researched the impact of institutional investors is in the UK. Chapter 1 was an 
attempt to rectify this situation to some extent. Consequently the main studies 
in this area were reviewed. The studies differed in their areas of analysis but 
the general consensus in all the studies was that in aggregate institutional 
investors are growing and very significant. Further analysis of institutional 
investors in an international framework revealed that institutional investors are 
relatively more important in the UK than in any of the countries in the survey 
and that this prominence has continued over the years. This suggests that in 
the UK this particular source of finance is very important for industry whereas 
other countries may benefit from a closer relationship between banks and 
industry and may not need to look for an alternative source of finance. 
In Chapter 2 the four groups of institutional investors were analysed 
individually to see how they differ in their size, their liabilities, their objectives 
and the competitive structure within which they operate. This was judged to be 
essential in order to understand their behaviour and to shed light on their 
preference for particular types of assets. 
Chapter 3 explored some of the broad forces that influence the 
structure of corporate ownership in the UK, in particular the influence of 
institutional investors. A sample of 278 large UK companies for the year 1989 
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was examined to see whether factors such as firm size or risk measures affect 
their choice of firms. The first hypothesis was that there is an inverse 
relationship between firm size and the concentration of ownership. The second 
postulated a negative relationship between the instability of a firm's 
environment and the concentration of ownership. In general, there was a 
negative and significant relationship between firm size and ownership 
concentration. This implies that the larger the firm the more diffuse the 
ownership structure and so it is difficult for any single investor to maintain a 
controlling interest. This result is consistent with both the results of Demsetz 
and Lehn and Leech and Leahy. 
This may appeal to institutional investors because by holding a 
relatively small share of a large firm they can benefit in a number of ways such 
as the ease of exit in the face of poor performance, the lower transaction costs 
attached to larger firms in comparison to smaller firms and a lower chance of 
being locked into a firm. 
The results were not conclusive for the risk variables which were 
found, on the whole, to be negatively related to ownership concentration but 
were not significant in all cases. This is consistent with the results of Leech 
and Leahy but in contrast to those of Demsetz and Lehn. The result suggests 
that institutional investors may not wish to get involved with the close running 
of the company and therefore a tight ownership structure is undesirable. 
Institutional investors have their own business to run and also hold such a 
diverse portfolio of assets that they are unlikely to spend too much time on any 
individual company despite any pressure to do so. 
The effects of institutional investors in the capital markets were 
considered in Chapter 4 focusing on three main aspects - efficiency, the use of 
information and volatility. It was thought to be important to assess whether the 
capital market is efficient in order to see whether security prices provide 
accurate signals for resource allocation. Although the evidence is not 
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conclusive there is a considerable support for the view that the capital market is 
efficient in the weak and semi-strong form but not in the strong form. This 
would imply that there is scope for profit where information differs between 
investors and so it would pay an investor to be better informed. Furthermore, 
increasing institutional investor presence implies that much of the market is 
dominated by informed investors thus leading to a more rapid and realistic 
adjustment of security prices and providing short term excess profits for those 
informed investors until the uninformed investors manage to incorporate the 
signals into their portfolios. Another area of concern was that the increased 
dominance of the institutions may lead to greater volatility in share prices as 
they move together in a `herd' due to similarities in their objectives and 
attitudes to risk and the information they receive. This herd-like behaviour may 
lead to a bullish effect on the share prices of the firms in which they invest and 
a decline in the price of shares in the firms they move out of. With regards to 
institutional investors following fads we provide anecdotal evidence that this is 
the case due to similarities in information and objectives. Some of the issues 
raised here were examined empirically in the next chapter. 
Chapter 5 was an empirical study for the years 1970-1987 
attempting to explain movements in the FI' all-share index in terms of 
institutional investor equity activity. The results suggest that the trading 
activities of the institutional investors do influence the general level of share 
prices in the UK stock market, with purchases resulting in price increases and 
sales resulting in price declines. Claims that the institutional investors move 
together in `herds' due to similarities in information were investigated. The 
results suggest the existence of long run stable relationships between the 
institutions but no conclusive evidence was found regarding the existence of 
fads. 
In Chapter 6 the switching activities of the institutional investors 
were examined to see if they have an effect on the market index. The empirical 
results suggest that some of the movements in the market index may be due to 
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switching. This could have significant effects on the economy as a whole 
because institutional investors have the capacity to put pressure on the prices of 
assets they prefer and could, in the extreme, cause booms or slumps in prices. 
This work has touched on some of the areas of the economy that 
institutional investors have been involved in. It does not, by any means, cover 
all the important issues which are necessary if a solid picture is to be formed 
about institutional investors. Consequently, there are a number of areas for 
further research, including: 
1) The necessity for further international comparisons 
2) Analysis of UK institutional investors in the EC 
3) Any major changes in the pension fund industry 
4) The changing rules and regulations regarding institutional investors. 
5) More rigorous and detailed analysis of the day to day movements of the 
purchasing and selling activities of institutional investors. 
6) Developments in the rules of disclosure, in particular, for pension funds 
7) The effects of institutional investors on mergers and acquisitions 
8) Analysis of the effects of institutional investors on `short-termism' 
9) Further analysis of the issue of volatility 
10) The potential influence of institutional investors on the management of 
companies. 
The purpose of this investigation has been a positive rather than a 
normative one and the thesis does not seek to draw explicit policy implications. 
Nonetheless, the empirical work undertaken has shown that institutional 
investors are major players in the capital markets in terms of their preferences 
and the information they have at their disposal. Hence any financial and 
regulatory policies adopted by the government must take account of their 
special characteristics. 
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Thus those who have argued that the growth of institutional 
investors is important are right, even though this study has not evaluated the 
(often divergent) policy implications they have drawn from this important 
insight. 
This has been a topic worthy of greater research and analysis not 
only because have institutional investors have been growing continuously and 
persistently in size but they also branch out and effect so many areas of the 
economy. The likely growth of institutional investors implies that continuous, 
ongoing research of its effects on the financial market and industry will be 
important for the foreseeable future. 
164 
APPENDIX A: SAMPLE OF FIRMS 
BEERS, WINES, SPIRITS 
Boddington Group 
Burtonwood Brewery 
Greenhall Whitley 
Greene King and Sons 
H. P. Bulmer 
Highland Distilleries Co. 
J. A. Devenish 
Macallan-Glenivet 
MacDonald Martin Distilleries 
Mansfield Brewery 
Marston Thompson and Evershed 
Morland and Company 
Vaux Group 
Whitbread and Co. 
Wolverhampton and Dudley Breweries 
Young and Co's Brewery 
CHEMICALS, PLASTICS 
Allied Colloids Group 
Amersham International 
Astra Holdings 
Blagden Industries 
Brent Chemicals International 
Caird Group 
Croda International 
Doeflex 
Ellis and Everard 
European Colour 
Evode Group 
Foseco 
Hickson International 
Laporte 
Leigh Interests 
Plysu 
Rentokil Group 
Sutcliffe Speakman 
Thurgar Bardex 
W. Canning 
Wardle Stores 
DRAPERY AND STORES 
Alexon Group 
Amber Day Austin Reed Group 
Blacks Leisure 
Body Shop International 
Brown and Jackson 
Burton Group 
Cantors 
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DRAPERY AND STORES cont. 
Conrad International 
Dixons Group 
Dunhill Holdings 
Empire Stores Group 
Forminster 
Hollas Group 
House of Lerose 
Liberty 
Next 
Pentos 
Ratners Group 
Tie Rack 
Time Products 
Upton and Southern Holdings 
Hogg Robinson 
Ritz Design group 
Wickes 
Wilding Office Equipment 
LEISURE 
Airtours 
Anglia TV 
Avesco 
Boosey and Hawkes 
Brent Walker Group 
Campari International 
Capital Radio 
Carlton Communications 
Central TV 
Chrysalis Group 
Ex-lands 
Fairline Boats 
First Leisure Corporation 
Grampian TV 
HTV Group 
Mecca Leisure 
Midsummer Leisure 
Noble Raredon 
Owners Abroad Group 
Pavillion Leisure 
Pickwick Group 
Quadrant Group 
The Really Useful Theatre Company 
Scottish TV 
Stanley Leisure Organisation 
TVS Entertainment 
Thames TV 
Tyne Tees TV Holdings 
Wembley 
Yorkshire TV 
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FOOD AND GROCERIES 
Asda Group 
Acatos and Hutcheson 
Alpine Group 
Argyll Group 
Associated British Foods 
Associated Fisheries 
A. G. Barr 
Berisford International 
Booker 
Borthwicks 
Brake Brothers 
Budgens 
Cadbury Schweppes 
Carr's Milling Industries 
Dalepak Food 
Dalgety 
Fitch Lovell 
J. England 
Geest 
Greggs 
Hazlewood Foods 
Hunter Saphir 
Iceland Frozen Foods 
Kwik Save Group 
Normans Group 
Nurdin and Peacock 
Park Food Group 
J. Sainsbury's 
Tate and Lyle 
Taveners 
Tesco 
Unigate 
United Biscuits 
PAPER, PRINTING AND ADVERTISING 
Abbott, Mead and Vickers 
Addison Consultancy 
Associated Paper Industries 
Bemrose Corporation 
Brunning Group 
Bunzl 
Burford Holdings 
Delyn Packaging 
FKB Group 
Ferguson Industrial Holdings 
Ferry Pickering Group 
Fotch - RSS 
Geers Gross 
Gold Greenless Trott 
Goodhead Group 
Holmes and Marchant Group 
Hunter print Group 
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PAPER. PRINTING AND ADVERTISING cont. 
Jarvis Porter Group 
Ketson 
Lopex 
Lowe Group 
More 0' Ferrall 
Olives Holdings 
Osborne and Little 
Osprey Communications 
Saatchi and Saatchi 
St. Ives 
Shandwick 
Tinsley Robor 
VPI Group 
Wpp 
Wace 
Waverley Cameron 
Yellowhammer 
PROPERTY 
Asda Property 
BHH Group 
Barlows 
British Land Company 
Bolton 
Cabra Estates 
Capital and Company 
Chesterfield Properties 
Christie Group 
Clarke, Nickolls and Coombs 
Citygrove 
Clayform Properties 
Connell 
Control Securities 
Dencora 
Erostin Group 
Fletcher King 
Greycoat 
Hanover Druce 
Helical Bar 
London and Metropolital 
Merival Moore 
mountleigh Group 
Mountview Estates 
Peel Holdings 
Priest Marians Holdings 
Regalian Properties 
Rosehaugh 
Trafford Park Estates 
Waterglade International Holdings 
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ELECTRICALS 
AMS Industries 
Admiral 
Alba 
Alphameric 
Amstrad 
Arlen 
Astec 
Betacom 
BICC 
Blick 
Chloride 
Cray Electronics 
Crystalite Holdings 
Dale Electric International 
Delta 
Dewhurst 
Electron House 
Emess 
Farrell Electronics 
Gardiner Group 
Harland Simon Group 
Jones Stroud Holdings 
Kode International 
LEC Refrigeration 
Logica 
Logitek 
Macro 4 
MBS 
Micro Focus Group 
Microfilm Reprographics 
Molynx Holdings 
Multitone Electronics 
Neotronics Technology 
Oxford Instruments Group 
P and P 
Pifco 
Racal Electronics 
Systems Reliability 
Thom EMI 
ELECTRONICS 
A Cohen and Co 
Aerospace 
Ash and LAcy 
Beauford 
Booth Industries 
Brasway 
Brooke Tool Engineering 
CI Group 
CAsting 
Chamberlain and Hill 
Clayton Son and Co. 
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ELECTRONICS cont. 
APV 
Adwest 
BM Group 
Bullough 
Davy Corporation 
GKN 
Cronite Group 
Edbro 
B Elliot 
Epicure 
Fife Indmar 
Fairey Group 
GEI International 
Garton Engineering 
Hill and Smith 
Jones and Shipman 
Neepsend 
Richards Group 
HAden MacLellan Holdings 
Hawker Siddeley Group 
Howden Group 
IMI 
Laird Group 
McKechnie 
Meggitt 
Molins 
Renold 
Simon Engineering 
600 Group 
Spirax Sarco 
Staveley Industries 
TI Group 
Triplex Lloyd 
Vickers 
Westland. 
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